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The Legal Salience of Taxation
Andrew T. Hayashit
Before an injury becomes a legal dispute, the injury must be named, a party
must be blamed, and a right against that injury must be claimed. What motivates
people to do these things and use legal institutions to seek redress? I provide a par-
tial answer to this question, using a unique dataset to identify the effect that the
salience of a tax-that is, its psychological prominence-has on whether a taxpayer
will use legal means to lighten the tax's burden. I term this effect its "legal sali-
ence." I find that reducing property tax salience makes homeowners less likely to
appeal their property-value assessments, making it more likely that homeowners
will remain overassessed and overtaxed. These overtaxed homeowners never per-
ceive--are never able to "name"-their injury and consequently never obtain the
relief to which they might be entitled. Moreover, I show that the selective use of ap-
peals caused by legal salience shifts the tax burden to racial minorities, immi-
grants, and working families with children. Scholars and lawmakers operate as if
only substantive law drives the distribution of a tax burden. But I show that legal
salience is one of a number of factors that also affects the tax distribution by
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motivating only certain individuals to seek tax relief, and I argue that tax laws
should be evaluated after taking into account the effects of legal salience.
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INTRODUCTION
Before an injury becomes a legal dispute, the injury must be
named, a party must be blamed, and a right against that injury
must be claimed.' Recognizing the importance of these three
1 See William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel, and Austin Sarat, The Emergence
and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming..., 15 L & Society Rev
631, 635-36 (1980-81).
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steps turns one's attention from how legal institutions adjudi-
cate disputes to what motivates injured parties to seek redress
in the first place. For example, if taxpayers are erroneously
overtaxed, how do they know it, and what do they do about it?
What causes someone who is overtaxed to seek relief? Is it the
ready availability of a tax advisor? Is it an abundance of time to
devote to what could be a lengthy or complicated legal process?
These sorts of factors will affect the ultimate distribution of the
tax burden by motivating some people, but not others, to seek
tax relief. These factors are arbitrary from the perspective of the
law and untethered from any normative theory of taxation, and
so their influences on tax distribution appear unjustified. More-
over, tax authorities and lawmakers typically cannot observe
how these factors are distributed among taxpayers, and so the
effects of those factors are neglected altogether.
Governments can tax only what they can observe or meas-
ure, such as income, property value, and the sale of goods or ser-
vices. This limitation is unfortunate because a taxpayer's ability
to pay is both unobservable and generally regarded by tax schol-
ars as the appropriate basis for determining one's proper share
of the tax burden.2 Recent legal scholarship has proposed crea-
tive ways that tax policy can take into account unobservable yet
normatively relevant taxpayer characteristics. 3 What has gone
2 See, for example, No6l B. Cunningham and Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a
Capital Gains Preference, 48 Tax L Rev 319, 364 (1993) ("Most commentators believe
that the [tax] base should reflect relative ability to pay."). Income, however, is an imper-
fect proxy for ability to pay. See David A. Weisbach, Toward a New Approach to Disabil-
ity Law, 2009 U Chi Legal F 47, 74-77 (discussing the problem of individuals with a high
ability to pay mimicking individuals with a low ability to pay through manipulation of
work effort). Some argue that conditioning local-tax liability on income has limited redis-
tributive benefits and negative efficiency effects arising from the taxpayers' ability to
relocate, and that local governments should rely on benefits taxes and leave ability-to-
pay taxes to higher levels of government. See, for example, Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Fed-
eralism 131-45 (Harcourt 1972); George F. Break, Financing Government in a Federal
System 252-55 (Brookings 1980); Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Tax Assignment and Revenue
Sharing in the United States, in Charles E. McLure Jr, ed, Tax Assignment in Federal
Countries 205, 212-16 (Australian National 1983). But see Timothy J. Goodspeed, A Re-
examination of the Use of Ability to Pay by Local Governments, 38 J Pub Econ 319, 339-
40 (1989) (arguing that welfare losses from migration are small and that redistribution
is possible).
3 See, for example, Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to
Target Tax Enforcement, 109 Colum L Rev 689, 712-14 (2009) (proposing the use of
menus of choices that will cause taxpayers to reveal information about themselves that
can be used to improve tax compliance); Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower Taxes, 99
Georgetown L J 1371, 1420-22 (2011) (arguing that menus can be used to help improve
taxpayer self-control). The related idea that contractual default terms can be set so that
parties opting out reveal information about themselves has been articulated by Professors
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largely unnoticed, however, is that tax systems already unwit-
tingly make taxes dependent on unobservable taxpayer charac-
teristics by providing for tax-mitigating procedures that favor
some taxpayers over others because of those characteristics. For
example, if the procedures available for reducing tax burdens
are more accessible to better-educated taxpayers, then the tax
system will tend to reward education, independent of any tax
credits or other benefits that the substantive law itself might
provide. In this Article, I find that the salience of a tax is an im-
portant factor motivating the use of administrative procedures
to reduce the tax's burden.
The salience of a tax generally refers to the effect of its visi-
bility or prominence on taxpayer decisions. 4 This visibility or
prominence can be manipulated by altering the way that the tax
is presented or paid. For example, the act of writing a large
check to the government coupled with the filing of a tax return
Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner. See Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in In-
complete Contracts:An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L J 87, 97 (1989). Pro-
fessor Bradley Karkkainen has made similar arguments in the administrative-law con-
text. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory
Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 Minn L Rev 943, 966-70 (2003)
(describing the value of penalty defaults in a regulatory context). This literature exploits
results from economics, in which this approach to overcoming information asymmetries
goes under the name of "screening." The economics literature has long recognized that
the self-selection of individuals into certain social programs, on the basis of unobservable
characteristics, can "tag" those individuals in an informative way that can be used to
make redistributive policies more efficient. See generally, for example, George A. Aker-
lof, The Economics of "Tagging" as Applied to the Optimal Income Tax, Welfare Pro-
grams, and Manpower Planning, 68 Am Econ Rev 8 (1978). Professor David Weisbach
has noted that the optimal-tax literature views optimal taxation as fundamentally a
screening problem. See Weisbach, 2009 U Chi Legal F at 74 (cited in note 2). See also
Jeff Strnad, The Progressivity Puzzle: The Key Role of Personal Attributes *6-16 (Stan-
ford Law School John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No 293,
Aug 2004), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=10289 (visited
Nov 3, 2014) (providing examples of various information-based taxation models).
4 See Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 Yale
J Reg 253, 262 (2011) ("With respect to taxation, salience is used to describe the degree
to which a tax or a tax provision is visible or prominent to the public."). I adopt this defi-
nition because of its specificity about the reason why the decision weight of a tax may
vary. For a broader definition, see David Gamage and Darien Shanske, Three Essays on
Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience, 65 Tax L Rev 19, 23 (2011) ("As we
use the term, 'tax salience' refers to the extent to which taxpayers account for the costs
imposed by taxation when the taxpayers make decisions or judgments."). This latter def-
inition roughly describes what Professors Xavier Gabaix and David Laibson refer to as a
"shrouded attribute." Xavier Gabaix and David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer
Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q J Econ 505, 512
(2006) ("[S]hrouded attributes are not taken into consideration by some potential
customers.").
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makes a tax more salient than if it were collected in smaller in-
crements throughout the year by withholding it from wages.
Professor Milton Friedman famously regretted his role in intro-
ducing income-tax withholding, believing that it reduced the sa-
lience of the income tax, which thereby reduced individuals' re-
sistance to the tax and, in turn, facilitated the growth of
government. The effect of tax salience on economic decisions
(such as how much to buy, invest, or work) has been referred to
as its "market salience," and the effect on political decisions
(such as whether to oppose the tax through voting, lobbying, and
so forth) is called its "political salience."6 In this Article, I pro-
vide empirical evidence of the effect of tax salience on the deci-
sion to use the legal system, which I term "legal salience."
Specifically, I find that reducing property tax salience
makes homeowners less likely to appeal their property-value as-
sessments, which makes it more likely that those homeowners
will remain overassessed and overtaxed.7 These overtaxed
homeowners never perceive their injury and consequently never
seek the legal relief to which they might be entitled. I also find
that property taxes are less salient for recent homeowners with
higher-priced mortgages, who are more likely to be racial minor-
ities, immigrants, and working families with children.8 Lower
legal salience means that this population bears a disproportion-
ate share of the property tax burden.
I examine the effect of property tax salience in New York
City using a unique dataset created for this analysis. Construct-
ing this dataset, which involved merging data from five different
sources and collecting nearly two million individual property tax
bills, allowed me to analyze the behavior of individual taxpayers
over time and thereby control for many factors that would oth-
erwise confound attempts to identify the effect of tax salience.
These tax bills provide information about how the presentation
and collection of the property tax varies across property owners
and over time. Some owners receive a bill and remit their prop-
erty tax payments directly to the city while others pay their tax-
es through an escrow account as part of their monthly mortgage
5 See Milton Friedman and Rose D. Friedman, Two Lucky People: Memoirs 123
(Chicago 1998).
6 Gamage and Shanske, 65 Tax L Rev at 20 (cited in note 4). Sometimes "market
salience" is referred to as "economic salience." Id. I choose the first convention because I
construe the term "economic" to include nonmarket behavior.
7 See Part I.D.
8 See Part II.D.1.
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payments. Homeowners using escrow never receive a bill from
the city and their tax payments are folded into a monthly pay-
ment that includes mortgage principal, interest, and insurance.
As a result, the property tax is less visible or prominent for
homeowners using escrow than for homeowners who pay the city
directly after receiving a bill. I show empirically that this differ-
ence in salience makes homeowners who use escrow accounts
less likely to appeal their tax assessments. 9
This Article makes two contributions. First, I theorize that
individuals might respond to lower tax salience by decreasing
their use of administrative remedies, and I provide empirical ev-
idence that they do respond in this way. Prior tax-salience
scholarship, in contrast, has focused almost exclusively on mar-
ket and political responses to tax salience.10 I find large and sta-
tistically significant positive effects of tax salience on the likeli-
hood of using the property-assessment appeals process.
Increasing the salience of a property tax has the same effect on
filing an appeal as increasing the benefits from a successful ap-
peal by $7,000.11 I also embed my empirical analysis of tax sali-
ence within a simple economic model of the decision to seek ad-
ministrative relief, which enhances the credibility of my findings
and illustrates how organizing empirical analysis around a
model of the individual's decision process makes it easier to in-
terpret the results and inform policy recommendations.12 I hope
9 See Part II.D.2.
10 Some scholarship doesn't fit snugly into these two categories. See, for example,
Jacob Goldin and Yair Listokin, Tax Expenditure Salience *3-5 (Seventh Annual Confer-
ence on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, July 2012), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=2097836 (visited Nov 3, 2014) (reporting evidence on the salience
of the charitable deduction and the home-mortgage-interest deduction); Brian Galle,
Federal Fairness to State Taxpayers: Irrationality, Unfunded Mandates, and the "SALT"
Deduction, 106 Mich L Rev 805, 824-30 (2008) (noting that tax salience may affect relo-
cation decisions); Sebastien Bradley, Property Tax Salience and Payment Delinquency
*3-5 (unpublished manuscript, Aug 2013), online at http://faculty.lebow.drexel.edu/
BradleyS/Prop-tax-delinquency-draft.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014) (reporting evidence that
reduced property tax salience increases the likelihood of late payments, underpayments,
and interest penalties).
11 For the computation of this number, see the discussion of coefficient magnitudes
accompanying note 112.
12 By specifying a model before looking at the data, I both motivate and discipline
the empirical analysis. The model motivates the analysis by suggesting which variables
are relevant to the decision and facilitating the interpretation of the empirical results.
Specifying which variables are relevant in the decision to seek administrative relief also
constrains the empirical analysis in a desirable way. Without specifying a theoretical
foundation for the selection of variables and the way that they affect the appeals deci-
sion, the temptation can be great for researchers to experiment with many combinations
1448 [81:1443
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that the framework presented here will be useful to scholars ex-
amining the effect of legal salience in other contexts.
Second, I report how legal salience is correlated with other
taxpayer characteristics. The central problem-and opportuni-
ty-posed by legal-salience heterogeneity is the effect that it has
on the distribution of the tax burden by shifting tax liability
from taxpayers for whom the tax is more salient ("high-salience
taxpayers") to those for whom the tax is less salient ("low-
salience taxpayers") as high-salience taxpayers make greater
use of tax-reducing procedures.13 Because its importance has not
generally been appreciated, the impact of salience on the distri-
bution of the tax burden is presumably unintended, and it may
be at cross-purposes with the goals of the tax system. Armed
with an accurate understanding of what motivates people to
seek administrative remedies, we can design administrative
procedures to further tax-policy goals rather than undermine
them.
Most scholarship has given the issue of tax-salience hetero-
geneity short shrift, largely because of data limitations in identi-
fying how tax salience varies.14 It is rare to be able to match in-
formation on individual taxpayers with how salient a tax is for
those taxpayers. Using regression analysis and a unique da-
taset, which I constructed for this purpose, I am able to report
evidence of legal salience and how it correlates with other indi-
vidual taxpayer characteristics. Mortgage escrow is the cause of
reduced legal salience in the context that I discuss. Because es-
crow reduces legal salience for mortgagors, and low-salience
taxpayers are more likely to remain overassessed, I find that, as
a practical matter, New York City's assessment-appeals process
likely results in heavier property tax burdens for homeowners
who use mortgage escrow. Mortgage escrow has historically been
required by mortgage lenders for homeowners who borrow more
than 80 percent of the purchase price of their homes, and it was
recently mandated by federal regulations for individuals receiv-
ing loans with an interest rate at least 1.5 percentage points
of variables in order to find statistically significant effects, potentially leading to spuri-
ous findings.
13 The shift occurs through anticipatory rate increases under New York City's
property tax, and through more indirect measures under other regimes. See Part II.A.3.
See also note 134 and accompanying text.
14 For an example of scholarship that does address this issue, see Jacob Goldin and
Tatiana Homonoff, Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Cigarette Tax Salience and Regressivity, 5
Am Econ J: Econ Pol 302, 331-33 (2013). See also note 50 and accompanying text.
20141 1449
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greater than the average prime lending rate. 15 Homeowners using
mortgage escrow tend to be racial minorities, immigrants, and
working families with children. 16 The causes and consequences of
legal-salience heterogeneity vary across contexts, so I cannot
make a universal claim about the distributional effects of legal-
salience heterogeneity. Nevertheless, my results clearly show
that legal-salience heterogeneity has real and unintended effects
on tax distribution and should be considered by tax agencies in
structuring administrative rules and procedures.
The case of New York City's property tax also illustrates
concerns common to any enforcement regime relying on individ-
ual reporting. Taxpayers will tend to report overassessments on-
ly when the tax savings from doing so will outweigh the costs to
them of appealing. This means that the use of the appeals pro-
cess is likely to vary across people because of variables that, alt-
hough arbitrary from the perspective of the law, affect those
perceived costs and benefits. These variables include a taxpay-
er's awareness of the appeals system, her ability to argue her
case before the appeals tribunal or hire expert counsel, and the
15 See notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
16 A system in which the use of potentially tax-reducing administrative procedures
is motivated by factors unrelated to the underlying merits of the case can introduce hori-
zontal and vertical inequities. For evidence of variation in property tax burdens across
income groups and property values, see G. Stacy Sirmans, Dean H. Gatzlaff, and David
A. Macpherson, Horizontal and Vertical Inequity in Real Property Taxation, 16 J Real
Est Literature 167, 177 (2008) (summarizing literature finding that horizontal inequity
arises "from unequal knowledge of market participants, unequal negotiating skills of
buyers and sellers, and actions by officials to limit property tax increases"); Marcus T.
Allen and William H. Dare, Identifying Determinants of Horizontal Property Tax Inequity:
Evidence from Florida, 24 J Real Est Rsrch 153, 159 (2002) (finding that property as-
sessment is more difficult in neighborhoods with a higher percentage of minority resi-
dents); Kenneth K. Baar, Property Tax Assessment Discrimination against Low-Income
Neighborhoods, 13 Urban L 333, 338-47 (1981) (describing widespread assessment dis-
crimination); Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, Property Tax Incidence on Owner-Occupied Housing:
Evidence from the Annual Housing Survey, 35 Natl Tax J 89, 95 (1982) (concluding that
income and tax elasticities are not homogeneous across income classes); Daniel P.
McMillen and Rachel N. Weber, Thin Markets and Property Tax Inequities: A Multino-
mial Logit Approach, 61 Natl Tax J 653, 664-68 (2008) (reporting evidence that sales
frequency positively affects uniformity of assessment ratios). In the case of the property
tax, horizontal inequities are differential rates of taxation for properties identical in all
relevant dimensions and vertical inequities are "inappropriate" patterns of tax differen-
tiation among dissimilar properties. For general definitions of these terms, see Louis
Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 Natl Tax J 139, 140
(1989) (noting that horizontal equity requires "equal treatment of equals" and vertical
equity requires "an appropriate pattern of differentiation ... among people who are not
equals"); Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 Natl Tax J 113, 113
(1990).
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cost of pursuing an appeal. I report evidence that mortgage es-
crow makes property owners less likely to appeal and therefore
more likely to bear a heavier tax burden than they would if they
did not use escrow. The use of mortgage escrow is a totally arbi-
trary determinant of property tax liability.
The question of how salience affects the use of administra-
tive remedies in tax law provides an entry point into a broader
set of policy questions. Specifically, one can apply the lessons
from my study to understand how idiosyncratic differences
among individuals affect their use of administrative procedures
and, consequently, the de facto allocation of social benefits and
burdens. For example, in the federal income tax context, taxpay-
ers may appeal determinations of tax deficiencies or proposed
adjustments to a tax return, seek relief from joint and several
liability between married taxpayers, challenge the imposition of
tax liens, amend a prior year's return, enter a voluntary compli-
ance program, or settle an outstanding tax liability for less than
its face amount. Claiming any of a variety of refundable tax
credits, such as the earned income tax credit, the child tax credit,
the American Opportunity Credit, or the 2007 economic-
stimulus payment, requires filing a federal income-tax return,
which many households do not do. But tax is just the tip of the
regulatory iceberg, and I suggest a select few topics of potential
research interest to scholars in other fields in Part III.B.
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows. Part I
introduces the concept of legal salience and discusses the causes
and consequences of legal-salience heterogeneity. Part II pre-
sents an empirical study of legal salience that examines its ef-
fect on property tax appeals in New York City. I begin the Part
by describing the institutional context in which appeals are
made. I then present a theoretical framework of the decision to
seek administrative relief, the data-collection process, and the
results of the empirical analysis. I also report evidence that
those most affected by legal salience are more likely to be racial
minorities, immigrants, and working families with children.
Part III provides an illustrative analysis of how legal-salience
heterogeneity affects the distribution of the tax burden, which
helps to identify relevant considerations for evaluating the ef-
fects of legal salience in other administrative contexts. I identify
some of these contexts before concluding.
2014] 1451
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I. LEGAL-SALIENCE AND TAXPAYER HETEROGENEITY
When the government burdens an activity by subjecting it
to a tax or regulation, there are at least three ways that people
respond: by doing less of the activity, by lobbying elected offi-
cials to change the law (or replacing those officials with others
more sympathetic to their plight), or by using whatever legal
means are available to reduce the weight of that burden. The
burgeoning literature on tax salience has explored how the visi-
bility or prominence of a tax affects the first two categories of re-
sponses-that is, the tax's market salience and the tax's political
salience. In Part I.A, I summarize this literature and introduce
legal salience as a third category of tax-salience responses. The
salience of a tax or regulation may not be the same for all peo-
ple. Although this differentiation has been acknowledged, most
scholarship on tax salience has implicitly assumed that taxes ei-
ther are salient or are not salient, without attending to the po-
tential implications of tax-salience heterogeneity across taxpay-
ers. In Part I.B, I describe some of the causes and consequences
of tax-salience heterogeneity. This discussion frames the empiri-
cal study of property tax appeals in Part II, in which I identify
the specific cause and consequences of salience effects in that
context.
A. Three Categories of Tax-Salience Effects
The notion that taxpayers respond differently to taxes de-
pending on how salient those taxes are to them has inspired a
growing body of scholarship in economics and law. In the market
context, because less salient taxes induce smaller behavioral re-
sponses than more salient taxes, salience affects both the ineffi-
ciencies created by a tax and who bears its economic burden.17 In
the political arena, tax salience influences the choice of tax in-
struments and tax rates by elected officials. Empirical research
in economics has identified these effects. Legal scholarship has
observed these findings, demarcated the concept of tax salience
17 See Raj Chetty, The Simple Economics of Salience and Taxation *3 (National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No 15246, Aug 2009), online at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15246 (visited Nov 3, 2014) (finding that the incidence of a
tax depends on its statutory incidence and that a tax can create deadweight loss even if
it induces no change in demand); Jacob Goldin, Optimal Tax Salience *9-14 (un-
published manuscript, Jan 2014), online at http://papers.ssrn.comsol3/papers.cfm
?abstractid=2009108 (visited Nov 3, 2014) (exploring the optimal mix of high- and low-
salience taxes).
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into the categories of market salience and political salience, and
explored the normative implications of these two kinds of sali-
ence. 18 However, none of this scholarship has examined how tax
salience affects the decision to make a legal claim.
1. Market salience.
The market salience of a tax refers to the effect of its visibil-
ity or prominence on consumers' market decisions, such as
whether to buy a particular good, invest in a particular asset, or
accept a particular job. Researchers have taken one of two ap-
proaches to identifying the effect of salience. The first is to directly
manipulate features of the tax that are presumed to affect its
visibility or prominence.19 For example, one might increase the
salience of a sales tax that is imposed at checkout by labeling
items on store shelves with the tax-inclusive price, or by divid-
ing the tax-inclusive price into its constituent parts and high-
lighting the tax component by underlining it or presenting it in
bold. This approach assumes that manipulating how a tax is
presented affects salience alone, but not any other characteris-
tics that are relevant to the purchasing decision. Under the sec-
ond approach, salience effects are inferred when a tax has a dif-
ferent effect on behavior than some other, economically
equivalent, component of the price. For example, if consumers'
demand for an item responds less to an increase in its price at-
tributable to a change in the sales tax than to an economically
equivalent increase in its pretax price, then one might infer that
the sales tax was less salient. This interpretation has certain
problems because other factors, such as an aversion to price
complexity or distaste for taxes in general, could explain why
"partitioning" a price into a tax and nontax component could af-
fect the demand for a good.20
Although work remains to be done to distinguish the effects
of salience from other effects of price presentation, there is a
growing body of empirical research documenting what appear to
be significant tax-salience effects. In a widely cited study,
18 See, for example, Schenk, 28 Yale J Reg at 297-310 (cited in note 4); Gamage
and Shanske, 65 Tax L Rev at 60-98 (cited in note 4).
19 See Schenk, 28 Yale J Reg at 272-73 (cited in note 4).
20 See Andrew T. Hayashi, Brent K. Nakamura, and David Gamage, Experimental
Evidence of Tax Salience and the Labor-Leisure Decision: Anchoring, Tax Aversion, or
Complexity?, 41 Pub Fin Rev 203, 206-07 (2013) (finding that partitioned-pricing effects
result from cognitive limitations).
14532014]
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Professor Raj Chetty, Professor Kory Kroft, and Adam Looney
report evidence that consumers are less likely to purchase cer-
tain items when the prices posted alongside those items are in-
clusive of sales tax, compared with when only the pretax price is
posted, even if consumers know the amount of sales tax that will
be imposed at checkout.21 They also find that consumer demand
is more responsive to increases in the rate of an excise tax,
which is reflected in the posted purchase price, than to an in-
crease in the rate of a sales tax, which is imposed at the register.22
In another oft-cited paper, Professor Amy Finkelstein re-
ports evidence that tolls have a smaller effect on highway driving
when they are paid by automatic electronic billing (E-ZPass col-
lection) than when they are paid in cash, presumably because
not having to produce a cash payment makes the toll less sali-
ent.23 Evidence of market-salience effects has also been reported
for automobile-purchasing decisions, which do not properly ac-
count for the effects of taxes on personal property or tax credits
provided for automobile purchases,24 and labor supply decisions,
which are affected by whether the worker is subject to a wage
tax or an economically equivalent consumption tax.25 Personal-
property taxes, tax credits, and consumption taxes are imposed
after the relevant economic decisions are made and are, for this
reason, less salient at the time of those decisions and therefore
less likely to be fully incorporated into the cost-benefit calculus.
2. Political salience.
The political salience of a tax refers to the effect of its visi-
bility or prominence on political decisions.26 The interaction be-
tween political salience in the minds of voters and in the minds
21 See Raj Chetty, Adam Looney, and Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation: Theory
and Evidence, 99 Am Econ Rev 1145, 1165-66 (2009).
22 See id at 1160-64.
23 See Amy Finkelstein, E-ZTax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates, 124 Q J Econ 969,
980-83 (2009).
24 See Richard L. Ott and David M. Andrus, The Effect of Personal Property Taxes on
Consumer Vehicle-Purchasing Decisions: A Partitioned Price/Mental Accounting Theory
Analysis, 28 Pub Fin Rev 134, 144-48 (2000); Kelly Sims Gallagher and Erich Muehleg-
ger, Giving Green to Get Green? Incentives and Consumer Adoption of Hybrid Vehicle
Technology, 61 J Envir Econ & Mgmt 1, 9-11 (2011).
25 See Tomer Blumkin, Bradley J. Ruffle, and Yosef Ganun, Are Income and Con-
sumption Taxes Ever Really Equivalent? Evidence from a Real-Effort Experiment with
Real Goods, 56 Eur Econ Rev 1200, 1206-07 (2012) (finding a significantly greater effect
from an income tax on labor supply than an economically equivalent consumption tax).
26 See Gamage and Shanske, 65 Tax L Rev at 20 (cited in note 4).
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of politicians, the degree to which the latter depends on the for-
mer, and how the two generate observable political outcomes is
complicated and largely the basis of conjecture. However, there
is some suggestive evidence and good intuition that tax policy
reflects political-salience effects.27
In her study of the effects of highway tolls, Finkelstein
found that politicians set higher highway toll rates when those
tolls are collected electronically than when they are collected by
cash payment.28 Finkelstein also reports that tolls are less likely
to increase during election years when tolls are collected by cash
than when they are collected electronically, which suggests that
the political costs of raising tolls may be reduced when those
tolls are less salient.29 Professors Marika Cabral and Caroline
Hoxby studied whether the salience of the property tax affects
two political outcomes: the existence of state-level statutory lim-
itations on property taxes and overall property tax rates.3 0 They
estimate that greater use of mortgage escrow, which reduces the
salience of the property tax, is associated with higher property
tax rates and fewer state-level limits on property taxes.31 These
effects presumably result from reduced political opposition to
the property tax.32
Recent legal scholarship has evaluated the propriety of us-
ing tax salience as an instrument for making tax policy more
equitable, efficient, and effective at raising revenue. Professor
Deborah Schenk argues that there are circumstances in which it
is appropriate for the government to exploit the fact that certain
taxes have low political salience.33 For example, politically non-
salient taxes may generate less resistance from voters during
periods of general antitax sentiment, making salience a poten-
tially valuable policy instrument during times in which it is
27 Professors Aradhna Krishna and Joel Slemrod argue that, in many settings, the
tax system is designed to minimize the perceived tax burden, but that in some situations
the system serves to maximize the perceived burden on high-income families. See Ara-
dhna Krishna and Joel Slemrod, Behavioral Public Finance: Tax Design as Price Presen-
tation, 10 Intl Tax & Pub Fin 189, 189-90 (2003).
28 See Finkelstein, 124 Q J Econ at 1002-05 (cited in note 23).
29 See id at 1004-05.
30 See Marika Cabral and Caroline Hoxby, The Hated Property Tax: Salience, Tax
Rates, and Tax Revolts *35-37 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
No 18514, Nov 2012), online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18514.pdf (visited Nov 3,
2014).
31 See id at *37-38.
32 See id at *22-27, 38-39.
33 See Schenk, 28 Yale J Reg at 297-310 (cited in note 4).
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difficult to raise revenue and the government is facing the pro-
spect of a fiscal crisis. Professors David Gamage and Darien
Shanske argue that categorical objections to reducing political
salience are misguided, contending that democratic values do
not necessitate using more politically salient taxes.34
3. Legal salience.
In many contexts taxpayers reacting to a tax economically,
by changing their consumption or investment decisions, or polit-
ically, by supporting elected officials whose fiscal policies reflect
the taxpayers' preferences. There is a third context in which
taxpayers can take actions that affect their tax liability. Many
tax regimes, including those for federal and state income taxes
and local property taxes, are enforced by administrative agen-
cies that have processes for challenging, appealing, or otherwise
adjusting taxpayer liabilities after they have been initially as-
signed. 35 Such processes are often initiated by the taxpayers
themselves. As a result, the pattern of use for these processes re-
flects the idiosyncratic cost-benefit calculus of those taxpayers,
incorporating their own beliefs, preferences, and circumstances.
For a variety of psychological and economic reasons, some people
are more likely to use legal processes and institutions than oth-
ers. Such differences can result in disparate effects from even
facially nondiscriminatory procedures.
As I show in Part II, the visibility or prominence of a tax af-
fects the likelihood that taxpayers will use administrative reme-
dies to reduce its burden. This effect is the legal salience of the
tax. There is no necessary connection among the legal salience,
market salience, and political salience of a tax. In particular, a
tax that is salient for the purpose of market decisions may not
be salient for political or legal decisions. This is because taking a
political or legal action to mitigate the effect of a tax requires
more information and resources than taking a market action.
Consider the case of an excise tax. An excise tax is generally in-
corporated into the price of the good or service presented to the
consumer and, consequently, has high market salience. All that
the consumer needs to know to respond optimally to the tax is
reflected in the price of the good. It doesn't matter what portion
of the price is attributable to the tax, what portion is attributable
34 See Gamage and Shanske, 65 Tax L Rev at 79-98 (cited in note 4).
35 See Part I.A.1.
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to the seller's costs, or what portion is attributable to the seller's
profit. Put differently, a consumer's market choices will general-
ly respond in the same manner to a fully salient tax increase
and an economically equivalent price increase that benefits the
seller. This will not be true of the taxpayer's political or legal de-
cisions, because a tax that is embedded in the price of something
will not prompt a taxpayer to seek political or legal remedies un-
less the taxpayer has reason to know that the price incorporates
a tax.
This distinction is especially pertinent in the context in
which I study legal salience. In this study, I identify the effect of
property tax salience on the willingness of taxpayers to appeal
their property assessments. I adopt a causal identification strat-
egy based on evidence reported by Cabral and Hoxby, who report
survey results showing that property taxes are less salient for
homeowners whose property taxes are included in the monthly
mortgage payments that they make to their mortgage ser-
vicers.36 Property taxes are more salient for homeowners who
pay the property tax directly to the taxing authority. 37 This find-
ing has some intuitive appeal. Mortgagors typically make
monthly payments to their mortgage servicers that include es-
crow contributions for mortgage and homeowners' insurance,
principal and interest, and property taxes. By lumping all of
these costs together into a single payment made to the mortgage
servicer rather than the ultimate recipients, escrow obscures the
components of the monthly payment and thereby reduces legal
salience.38 And the shock of large property tax bills is avoided by
disaggregating what would generally otherwise be quarterly,
semiannual, or annual property tax payments into smaller, month-
ly payments. My analysis examines the relationship between the
36 See Cabral and Hoxby, The Hated Property Tax at *23-27 (cited in note 30). The
first to speculate about the effect of mortgage escrow on tax salience was Professor Peter
Ordeshook. See Peter C. Ordeshook, Property Tax Consciousness, 34 Pub Choice 285,
288-90 (1979). Ordeshook surveyed 320 taxpayers and found no statistically significant
relationship between the taxpayers' error in recalling their property tax liability and
whether they pay taxes out of escrow, after controlling for income and education. See id
at 286-90. However, his data limitations and comparatively rudimentary empirical
analysis caution against drawing strong conclusions from the study.
37 Homeowners with tax escrow report their taxes with greater error than those
without, although this error is unbiased. See Cabral and Hoxby, The Hated Property Tax
at *29-30 (cited in note 30).
38 Although forthcoming regulations may require servicers to provide statements
indicating to borrowers the portion of their monthly payments that is allocated to each of
these costs, this has not been standard practice. See note 46.
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use of mortgage escrow as a cause of tax (non)salience and the
probability of filing an appeal, while controlling for other factors
affecting the appeals decision.
There have been only two empirical studies of the role of as-
sessment appeals on the distribution of the property tax burden.
These studies show that tax appeals are correlated with neigh-
borhood characteristics such as home values, the proportion of
residents who own their home, and the share of African Ameri-
can and Hispanic residents.39 Neither of these studies examines
the effect of property tax salience on assessment appeals. Although
any arbitrary factor driving the decision to use administrative
procedures merits scrutiny for its distributional consequences,
tax salience is a good place to start from a policy perspective be-
cause it is more easily manipulated by regulators than, for exam-
ple, the opportunity cost of taxpayers' time or other individual-
specific factors that affect the appeals decision. If the mechanism
for manipulating legal salience is known by the tax authority,
then its effects can be monitored to ensure that distributional ob-
jectives are not undermined by the inequitable use of adminis-
trative procedures. If that mechanism is not known, then legal
salience may vary in an unpredictable way across taxpayers, af-
fecting the allocation of the tax burden. This variation is the topic
of the next Section.
B. Taxpayer Heterogeneity
Taxpayers differ in all sorts of ways. They vary in their
preferences for consumption, saving, and investment. They dif-
fer in their personalities, abilities, patience, and willpower. They
possess disparate beliefs about the past and their future pro-
spects, and they live in widely divergent circumstances. Such
differences provide information that society might like to use in
making tax policy, setting the terms of redistribution, and devis-
ing rules that collect revenue while minimizing inefficiencies
39 See generally Rachel N. Weber and Daniel P. McMillen, Ask and Ye Shall Re-
ceive? Predicting the Successful Appeal of Property Tax Assessments, 38 Pub Fin Rev 74
(2010); William M. Doerner and Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, An Empirical Critique of the Property
Tax Appeals Process (unpublished manuscript, Jan 2012), online at http://artsci.wustl.edu/
-cre/ihlanfeldt-paper.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014). Professors Weber and McMillen also report
evidence that a reduced likelihood of appeal is associated with higher frequencies of local
sales or a recent sale of the property itself, suggesting that a richer informational envi-
ronment could reduce the frequency of appeals by increasing assessor accuracy and
property owners' knowledge of the local housing market. See Weber and McMillen, 38
Pub Fin Rev at 94.
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associated with behavioral distortions. Many of these taxpayer
differences are unobservable, however, and tax liability can typ-
ically be assigned only on the basis of observable or measurable
characteristics.
When unobservable characteristics differ among taxpayers
who are identical along the observable dimensions that the tax
law takes into account, inequities can arise.40 For example, vari-
ation in the legal salience of the property tax across homeowners
can cause two properties, identical in every dimension specified
under the law, to be taxed at different rates if one homeowner
makes use of administrative procedures that reduce her tax
burden while the other does not. Recent scholarship has argued
that unobserved taxpayer heterogeneity presents opportunities
as well as challenges for tax policy. In some circumstances, tax-
payers can be induced to reveal information about themselves by
selecting from a menu of tax-policy options, and the options
themselves can be tailored to taxpayers who would choose them.
Whether such an approach is necessary, or if there are instead
more direct options for dealing with heterogeneity, depends on
the underlying causes of that heterogeneity. In this Section, I
describe some of the causes of legal-salience heterogeneity and
discuss their implications.
1. Causes of tax-salience heterogeneity.
The salience of a tax depends on (1) the characteristics of
taxpayers themselves, (2) the way that the government imposes
the tax, and (3) the interventions of private market actors. Con-
sequently, a tax may be more salient for certain taxpayers than
for others because the taxpayers have different characteristics
(such as educational attainment), because the tax is presented
differently by the government, or because market actors vary in
whether they take actions that heighten or diminish the promi-
nence of the tax. Understanding how these factors interact is es-
sential for identifying how legal salience affects the allocation of
the tax burden and what tools are available for changing it. In
what follows I refer to "tax-salience heterogeneity," which is
simply variation in the visibility or prominence of a tax across
taxpayers for any of these reasons.
40 How inequitable one finds such results depends on how well the observable fac-
tors specified by law capture the characteristics that provide the normative basis for
taxation and what effects the unobservable characteristics have on the distribution of
the tax burden.
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To the limited extent that it has been discussed in the liter-
ature, tax-salience heterogeneity has generally been identified
with differences among taxpayers themselves. For example, Pro-
fessor Brian Galle identifies the opportunity cost of time, prefer-
ences for current consumption and saving, and the cognitive
ability required to calculate the effects of taxes on after-tax pric-
es as factors that vary across taxpayers and affect market sali-
ence.41 These factors affect the cognitive costs and benefits of
taking taxes into account when making market decisions and
thereby affect the likelihood that taxes will affect behavior.
Some taxpayers ignore tax prices because it is rational to do so
(in light of the costs of performing the necessary calculations).
Other taxpayers neglect the effects of taxes because they are
unaware of those effects, not because they deliberately decide
not to compute them.42 For these taxpayers, other factors, such
as the ability to pay for professional assistance in tax planning,
play important roles in determining tax salience.43
Differences in the way that a tax is imposed or collected can
also create tax-salience heterogeneity. For example, collecting
tolls for some highways electronically but collecting tolls for oth-
er highways in cash will make the toll less salient for drivers on
the first highway than for drivers on the second. 44 Collecting in-
come taxes by wage withholding from some taxpayers and not
from others could cause the income tax to be more salient for
those not subject to withholding. Requiring some homeowners to
pay their property taxes through escrow accounts makes the tax
less salient to them than to homeowners who pay their taxes di-
rectly to the local taxing authority. In July 2008, the Federal
Reserve Board ("the Board") issued final regulations requiring
for the first time that lenders create escrow accounts on behalf
of borrowers with certain "higher-priced" (that is, riskier) loans
41 See Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 Wash U L Rev 59, 70-77 (2009). Galle notes
that if poorer people have higher discount rates, they may be more likely to pay the hid-
den tax as the value of saving what was spent on the tax will be less to them. Similarly,
if the calculations are easier for richer people to perform, or they have access to profes-
sional counsel who can advise them about tax costs, the tax may be regressive. See id at
100-04. Professor Jacob Nussim has argued that tax-exclusive pricing shifts the tax bur-
den from the more to the less psychologically biased. See Jacob Nussim, To Confuse and
Protect: Taxes and Consumer Protection, 1 Colum J Tax L 218, 244-47 (2010). See also
Gamage and Shanske, 65 Tax L Rev at 77 (cited in note 4) (identifying "general cognitive
ability" as affecting distribution of tax salience).
42 See Galle, 87 Wash U L Rev at 87-88 (cited in note 41).
43 See id at 104.
44 See Finkelstein, 124 Q J Econ at 980-83 (cited in note 23).
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that are secured by the borrowers' principal residences. 45 On
March 2, 2011, the Board published proposed rules that would,
among other things, lengthen the required escrow period from
one to five years (and establish an even longer period in certain
cases, such as when the borrower is delinquent or in default).46
These regulatory changes will likely lead to wider use of mort-
gage escrow. 47
Finally, tax-salience effects can be created through the deci-
sions of private market actors. Because tax salience affects mar-
ket choices, sellers of taxed goods have incentives to highlight
tax benefits (such as income tax credits and deductions) and
downplay tax costs (such as personal-property taxes) that are
associated with their products. The marketing activities of these
actors are driven by their own profit-maximization calculi, and
there will invariably be an element of selectivity in the popula-
tions that they target. This selectivity also can create tax-
salience heterogeneity.
2. Consequences of legal-salience heterogeneity.
The central problem-and opportunity-posed by legal-
salience heterogeneity is the effect that it has on the distribution
of the tax burden. Because its importance has not generally been
appreciated, its effects are unintended and may be at cross-
purposes with some of the tax system's goals. Armed with an
45 "Higher-priced" loans are those with an annual percentage rate (APR) at least
1.5 percentage points greater than an estimate of the average prime lending rate; these
loans generally include so-called subprime and Alt-A loans. See 12 CFR § 226.35(a)(1).
These regulations amended Regulation Z, the implementing regulation for the Truth in
Lending Act, 15 USC § 1601 et seq, and were issued under the Board's grant of rulemak-
ing authority under the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub L No
103-325, 108 Stat 2190. See Federal Reserve System, Truth in Lending, Proposed Rule,
76 Fed Reg 11598, 11598 (2011).
46 76 Fed Reg at 11599. The proposed rules would implement certain changes to the
Truth in Lending Act made by Title XIV of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010). See 76 Fed
Reg at 11598. Sections 1461 and 1462 of Dodd-Frank created the new § 129D of the
Truth in Lending Act, which generally codifies the Board's 2008 regulations but also
added disclosure requirements, lengthened the required escrow period, and increased the
threshold APR for jumbo loans to become subject to mandatory escrow. Id.
47 Forcing homeowners to save a portion of their income each month for property
tax and insurance payments may make homeowners less likely to become delinquent on
these payments. There is evidence that large lump-sum payments can have severe li-
quidity effects on households that lead to mortgage default. See Nathan B. Anderson and
Jane K. Dokko, Liquidity Problems and Early Payment Default among Subprime Mort-
gages *4 (Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2011-09, Nov 2010), online at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2011/201109/201109pap.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014).
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accurate understanding of what motivates people to seek admin-
istrative remedies, processes for seeking relief can be designed
to further-rather than undermine-those goals. For this study,
I was able to observe one cause of reduced legal salience: the use
of mortgage escrow. If the cause of salience can be directly ma-
nipulated, the remedy for salience heterogeneity is relatively
simple. When the causes are unobservable, designing a system
that harnesses those differences in a desirable way is more com-
plicated. However, recent legal scholarship has proposed crea-
tive ways that tax design and enforcement can take into account
unobservable but normatively relevant characteristics by en-
couraging taxpayers to sort themselves into alternative regimes.
Professor Alex Raskolnikov has argued that tax enforce-
ment can exploit differences among taxpayers in their motiva-
tions for tax compliance by presenting all taxpayers with a
choice between two different enforcement regimes, each of which
attracts a different sort of taxpayer according to those motiva-
tions. For example, a "compliance regime" characterized by a
progovernment presumption for resolving gray areas of the tax
law will be less desirable for aggressive taxpayers-whose tax
planning involves exploiting legal uncertainty-than for those
taxpayers who do not attempt to exploit this uncertainty. An al-
ternative "deterrence regime" may be more attractive to precise-
ly these aggressive taxpayers, even if it is characterized by high-
er penalties for tax avoidance. The incentives for compliance in
the two regimes can be tailored to have the greatest effects on
the sorts of taxpayers who elect to participate in those regimes. 48
Professor Lee Fennell has applied the same concept to a differ-
ent problem, arguing that heterogeneity in willpower among
taxpayers suggests that it may be possible to introduce elective
tax regimes for sin taxes that would allow taxpayers to select
the tax schedule that best helps them pursue their long-term in-
terests in light of their particular ability to resist temptation.
Like Raskolnikov, Fennell considers the possibility of "offering a
choice between [] regulatory bundles" to affect the behavior of
taxpayers with heterogeneous interests. 49
48 See Raskolnikov, 109 Colum L Rev at 713-14 (cited in note 3).
49 Fennell, 99 Georgetown L J at 1375 (cited in note 3). For illustrations of how self-
sorting pertains to self-control issues, see Ted O'Donoghue and Matthew Rabin, Study-
ing Optimal Paternalism, Illustrated by a Model of Sin Taxes, 93 Am Econ Rev 186, 186-
87 (2003); Jay Bhattacharya and Darius Lakdawalla, Time-Inconsistency and Welfare
*3-4 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No 10345, Mar 2004),
online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10345 (visited Nov 3, 2014); Susanna Esteban
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Just like characteristics such as individual willpower and
motivations for tax compliance, tax salience is heterogeneous
and typically unobservable to the tax authority. However,
whereas the use of menus to sort taxpayers into different tax re-
gimes on the basis of compliance motives or willpower remains
only a possibility, tax administration already operates in line
with tax-salience heterogeneity, sorting high-salience taxpayers
into a group that avails itself of administrative remedies and
low-salience taxpayers into a group that does not. However, be-
cause this effect is unintentional, the effects of that sorting on the
efficiency and equity of the tax system have not been scrutinized.50
and Eiichi Miyagawa, Optimal Menu of Menus with Self-Control Preferences *1-5 (Co-
lumbia University Department of Economics Discussion Paper No 0405-11, Dec 2006),
online at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=lO.1.1.168.4384&rep=repl&
type=pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014). See also Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 Harv
L Rev 1399, 1454-57 (2005); Weisbach, 2009 U Chi Legal F at 85-90 (cited in note 2)
(arguing that commodity taxes or in-kind provision of certain goods may be desirable as
a component of disability-law policy when disabilities are unobservable). Tax electivity,
in general, is a well-studied topic. See generally, for example, Heather M. Field, Choos-
ing Tax. Explicit Elections as an Element of Design in the Federal Income Tax System, 47
Harv J Leg 21 (2010). See also, for example, Erzo F.P. Luttmer and Richard J. Zeck-
hauser, Schedule Selection by Agents: From Price Plans to Tax Tables *2 (National Bu-
reau of Economic Research Working Paper No 13808, Feb 2008), online at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w13808 (visited Nov 3, 2014).
50 Unobserved taxpayer heterogeneity also affects canonical results in the economic
theory of optimal taxation. Professor Louis Kaplow has demonstrated that unobserved
differences in taxpayer characteristics can undermine standard arguments for uniform
commodity taxation, the efficient provision of public goods, and taxation subsidies for
activities generating externalities. See generally Louis Kaplow, Optimal Policy with Het-
erogeneous Preferences, 8 BE J Econ Analysis & Pol *1 (2008) (noting that optimal tax
rules in public economics are usually derived in models with homogeneous preferences,
and exploring how standard results are affected by preference heterogeneity). Applying
these results in the salience context requires developing an understanding of how sali-
ence is correlated with normatively relevant taxpayer characteristics. However, research
has only begun to explore the connection between tax-salience heterogeneity in market
decisions and its relationship with these characteristics. The evidence on heterogeneity
of cognitive biases and the relationship with income is scarce. But see Goldin and
Homonoff, 5 Am Econ J: Econ Pol at 331-33 (cited in note 14) (reporting evidence that
sales taxes imposed at the register are more salient for low-income than high-income
consumers, implying that the optimal rate of a low-salience sales tax imposed at check-
out is positive); Sendhil Mullainathan and Eldar Shafir, Savings Policy and Decision-
Making in Low-Income Households, in Michael S. Barr and Rebecca M. Blank, eds, In-
sufficient Funds: Savings, Assets, Credit, and Banking among Low-Income Households
121, 129-33 (Russell Sage 2009) (arguing that the poor exhibit the same behavioral pat-
terns as the more well-off but that the poor operate in a context characterized by a nar-
row margin for error, leading to different outcomes); Kelly Shue and Erzo F.P. Luttmer,
Who Misvotes? The Effect of Differential Cognition Costs on Election Outcomes, 1 Am
Econ J: Econ Pol 229, 245-46 (2009) (finding that communities with high levels of pov-
erty exhibit significantly higher levels of "misvoting").
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II. A STUDY OF LEGAL SALIENCE: PROPERTY TAX APPEALS
In this Part, I present an empirical analysis of the property
tax-appeals process in New York City that illustrates some of
the causes and consequences of the legal-salience heterogeneity
described above. I begin by describing the institutional context
in which property tax appeals are made. Understanding these
details is necessary to formulate a reasonable economic model of
the appeals decision, which I provide in Part II.B. This theoreti-
cal model incorporates tax salience as a potential determinant of
the decision to appeal. I describe in Part II.C how I collected da-
ta to evaluate the theoretical model. I also describe my approach
for identifying the effect of tax salience on the use of the appeals
process. The results of my analysis demonstrate that decreasing
tax salience has a large and statistically significant negative ef-
fect on the probability that a homeowner will use the assess-
ment appeals process. Other variables that one would expect to
affect the appeals decision, such as the potential savings from a
successful appeal, have effects on the probability of appeal that
are otherwise consistent with a rational-taxpayer model.
A. Taxes, Tax Appeals, and Mortgage Escrow in New York City
1. Background.
In New York City, a property owner's tax liability is the re-
sult of a complex computation that incorporates characteristics
of the property and its use, characteristics of the owner, the De-
partment of Finance's (DOF) estimate of the property's market
value, and changes in the value of that property in prior years.
One of the most important variables in this computation is the
property's assessed value. It is this component of the property
tax computation that taxpayers can challenge by appealing to
the New York City Tax Commission ("Commission").51 Before
turning to a detailed explanation of the appeals process, I begin
by explaining how property tax liabilities are assigned in the
first instance, focusing on the Class 1 properties that are the ob-
ject of my empirical analysis.
51 The Commission also has the authority to change the tax class of the property
and any exemptions to which the property is entitled. Tax Commission of the City of
New York, How. to Appeal a Tentative Assessment *2 (2014), online at http://www.nyc.gov/
html/taxcomm/downloads/pdf/tc600.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014). Nearly all appeals challenge
a property's assessed value. See id.
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New York City's fiscal year runs from July 1 to June 30. The
city fixes its expenditures and forecasts its revenues from
sources other than the property tax. The difference between
these two amounts is the revenue to be raised from the property
tax. 52 The amount that is billed to property owners is known as
the levy, which is equal to the amount of revenue that must be
collected plus a reserve for anticipated refunds, current-year
collections levied in prior years, and uncollectible taxes. 53 For
property tax purposes, real property is divided into four classes:
Class 1 includes one-, two-, and three-family residential proper-
ties, residentially zoned vacant land, and small condominiums;
Class 2 includes all remaining residential property, such as
large rental buildings, condominiums, and co-ops; Class 3 in-
cludes property owned by utilities; and Class 4 consists of all
other property, including property with commercial uses. 54 The
share of the property tax levy that is billed to each class of prop-
erty is relatively stable from year to year but has been adjusted
slowly over time to better reflect the market value of the proper-
ties in each class. 55 Once the levy for each class is determined,
the New York City Council fixes four different tax rates, one for
each class. These rates are calculated by dividing the levy on
each class by the billable assessed value for that class. 56
Between July and January of each fiscal year, all properties
in the city are valued and assessed.57 No later than January 18,
the DOF publishes online a tentative assessment roll, which
52 City of New York, Department of Finance, Office of Tax Policy, The New York
City Property Tax FY 2013 Annual Report *25 (Oct 2013), online at http://www.nyc.gov/html/
dofdownloads/pdf/reports/reports%20-%20property%/o2tax/nyc-property-tax-fy3.pdf (visit-
ed Nov 3, 2014). Although the property tax appears, under the law, to be meant to fill a
budget gap, because of political constraints it is rarely used that way. Instead, expendi-
tures are adjusted to balance the budget.
53 Id at *25-26. The property tax reserve includes items that affect property tax
revenue but that are independent of the levy.
54 Id at *25.
55 See id. Each class's share of the levy is based on the share of the levy that such
class represented in 1989 (the "base proportions"). The base proportions are adjusted by
New York's Office of Real Property Tax Services to generate the "current base propor-
tions." Id. These are then further adjusted "to reflect physical and other non-equalization
(non-market) changes that are reflected on the current assessment roll." Id.
56 New York City Council, Budget Process *19-20, online at http://council.nyc.gov/
htmllabout/budget.shtml (visited Nov 3, 2014).
57 See id at *20. Residential and commercial properties are valued by the DOF.
New York City Office of Management and Budget, Tax Revenue Forecasting Documenta-
tion: Financial Plan Fiscal Years 2012-2016 *19, online at http://www.nyc.gov/html/omb/
downloads/pdf/methodology_2013-04.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014). Utility property is valued
by the state's Office of Real Property Tax Services. Id at *22.
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includes each property's tax class, assessed value, and the por-
tion of any such value that is eligible for exemption.58 Each
property owner is also sent a Notice of Property Value, which
details how the taxable assessed value of the owner's property
was determined. The notice includes the DOF's determination of
the tax class to which the property belongs, its estimate of the
market value of the property, any exempt portion of the prop-
erty's value, and a description of how the market value was
determined.59
The tax on a property is calculated in several steps. First,
the DOF estimates the market value of the property, generally
either by reference to the sales of comparable properties within
the prior year or by capitalizing the income and expenses associ-
ated with renting the property.60 Second, this market value es-
timate is multiplied by the "assessment ratio," which is 6 per-
cent for Class 1 properties and 45 percent for all other
properties.61 This product would be the assessed value of the
property were it not for special cap rules that limit the amount
by which a property's assessed value can change from one year
to the next. In the case of Class 1 properties, the assessed value
of a property cannot increase by more than 6 percent in any one
year or 20 percent over five years.62 After application of the cap
rules, the total amount of any exemptions is subtracted from the
assessed value to determine the taxable assessed value.63 This
amount is multiplied by the tax rate for the class to which the
property belongs to determine the property tax liability. This li-
ability may be reduced by abatements in certain cases, although
these are rare for Class 1 properties. 64
58 Tax Commission of the City of New York, How to Appeal a Tentative Assessment
at *1 (cited in note 51).
59 Id at* 1-3.
60 For certain specialty properties, the city uses a cost-based valuation method. See
City of New York, Department of Finance, Determining Your Assessed Value, online at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dof/html/property/property-val-assessment.shtml (visited Nov
3, 2014).
61 Tax Commission of the City of New York, How to Appeal a Tentative Assessment
at *1 (cited in note 51).
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 See Office of Tax Policy, Annual Report on Tax Expenditures: Fiscal Year 2013
*137 (NYC Finance Apr 11, 2014), online at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dof/downloads/pdf/
13pdflter_2013_final.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014) (indicating that only 445 one-, two-, and
three-family residences citywide received the most common abatement in fiscal year
2013).
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2. Property tax billing and mortgage escrow.
The DOF prepares Statements of Account (SOAs) for each
property, generally on a quarterly basis. Each SOA is both a
property tax bill and an account summary. All properties with
assessed values of $250,000 or less pay property taxes quarterly,
while properties with assessed values greater than this amount
pay semiannually.65 SOAs are mailed a month before payments
are due; the due dates are July 1, October 1, January 1, and
April 1 for quarterly payers and July 1 and January 1 for semi-
annual payers. 66 Property owners do not receive an SOA if they
pay taxes through a bank or mortgage-servicing company or if
they do not have an outstanding tax balance, unless they are re-
sponsible for other charges, such as sidewalk fees or emergency
repairs.67 Property owners paying their taxes through mortgage
escrow do not receive SOAs but may view them on the DOF's
website.68
Ordinarily, a mortgage lender will create an escrow account
when it originates a mortgage, after which a mortgage servicer
will administer the account.69 The mortgagor will make monthly
contributions to this escrow account to pay property taxes,
homeowner's insurance, and mortgage insurance. The servicer
will then disburse amounts as tax and insurance bills are re-
ceived.7o Escrow accounts have historically been required for the
first year after origination for mortgages insured by the Federal
Housing Administration and Department of Veterans Affairs,
but recent regulations have extended these requirements to
most "higher-priced" mortgages. 71 When not otherwise required,
lenders typically require escrow for mortgages originated with a
loan-to-value ratio greater than 80 percent, although there is
some variation across lenders in their escrow practices72 Business
65 City of New York, Department of Finance, Property Tax Bill Information and Pay-
ment, online at http://www.nyc.govfhtml]dof/html/property/propertybilLsoa.shtml (visited
Nov 3, 2014).
66 City of New York, Department of Finance, Due Dates, online at http://www.nyc.gov/
htmlldoflhtmlproperty/property__bilLduedates.shtml (visited Nov 3, 2014).
67 DOF, Property Tax Bill Information (cited in note 65).
68 Id ("We do not mail you a Property Tax Bill if your property taxes are paid
through a bank or mortgage servicing company or if you have a zero balance.").
69 See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, What Is an Escrow or Impound Ac-
count?, Ask CFPB (June 23, 2014), online at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/
140/what-is-an-escrow-or-impound-account.html (visited Nov 3, 2014).
70 See id.
71 See notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
72 See Cabral and Hoxby, The Hated Property Tax at *11-12 (cited in note 30).
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practices vary because of differences in the scale and focus of
lenders' businesses, such as the kinds of loans that they make or
whether they tend to operate in jurisdictions where the local as-
sessors have the administrative capabilities to make escrow
cost-effective. Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
of 1974,73 lenders may require mortgagors to contribute in excess
of their annual insurance and estimated tax liabilities to provide
a cushion of up to two months of escrow payments.7 4 In rare cases,
property owners may choose to establish their own tax-escrow
accounts.
Escrow arrangements generally terminate upon the satis-
faction of the mortgage for which they were created. In some cir-
cumstances property owners may be able to opt out of mortgage
escrow, although such opt outs typically come at a price: the fee
to forgo escrow is generally around 0.25 percent of the loan bal-
ance. 75 Lenders tend to prefer escrow arrangements because
these arrangements give lenders control over the payment of
property tax and insurance bills and allow them to prevent a tax
lien from attaching to the property because of property tax de-
linquency. Lender practices about when homeowners may be
permitted to opt out vary, with lenders generally requiring es-
crow so long as the loan-to-value ratio is above 80 percent.7 6 In
the case of government-insured loans, property owners are not
required to maintain escrow throughout the life of the loan, so
some lenders maintain an escrow account only for the first year.
Escrow accounts in New York are terminated in accordance with
New York State law.77
73 Pub L No 93-533, 88 Stat 1724, codified as amended at 12 USC § 2601 et seq.
74 12 USC § 2609.
75 See Vickie Elmer, Shrinking the Escrow, NY Times RE2 (Feb 5, 2012).
76 See K.C. Hernandez, Mandatory Requirements to Refund an Escrow Account,
SFGate Home Guides, online at http:/fhomeguides.sfgate.com/mandatory-requirements
-refund-escrow-account-100278.html (visited Nov 3, 2014).
77 Title 3-A of the New York Real Property Tax Law deals with tax-escrow ac-
counts. The bank maintaining the escrow account must provide a report on the account
at least annually to the account holder. NY Real Property Tax Law § 953(6). Within
twenty-one days after final payment of the mortgage loan, if the mortgagor retains own-
ership of the property, the bank must send to the borrower a written statement stating
that the escrow account has been or will be terminated and that the borrower will be
obliged to pay taxes becoming due thereafter unless a new escrow account is established.
NY Real Property Tax Law § 953(8).
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3. Assessment appeals.
Property tax appeals have increased over time and acceler-
ated following the recent housing-market collapse. 78 In New
York City, the tax-appeals process in 2013 generated $6.5 billion
in assessment reductions and $572,932,181 in tax reductions for
those properties. 79 Because the city anticipates the effects of the
tax-appeals process when setting the property tax rates for the
coming fiscal year, the effect of assessment reductions is to in-
crease rates, thereby shifting tax liability from those who suc-
cessfully appeal their assessments to other property owners.
Property owners can file appeals for one-, two-, and three-
family homes with the Commission between January 15 and
March 15.80 The Commission is an independent body that views
its role as "help[ing] the City maintain the integrity of the prop-
erty tax assessment rolls, the sound and equitable allocation of
the property tax burden and promot[ing] public confidence in
government and the tax system."'3 Its review process helps re-
duce the number of disputes litigated in court-disputes that
can be costly for both the city and taxpayers. By revising as-
sessments before the final roll is published, the city is also
spared the expense of refunding tax overpayments.
A typical application requests review of a property's as-
sessed value, but applications can request review of any aspect
78 The president of the Commission has noted "a growing trend of people filing [ap-
peals,] especially with the down turn in the market." Bob Hennelly, Tight Financial
Times Have More City Homeowners Appealing Tax Bills, WNYC News (Mar 15, 2012),
online at http://www.wnyc.org/articles/wnyc-news/2012/mar/15/tight-financial-times-have
-more-city-home-owners-appealing-tax-bills (visited Nov 3, 2014). Class 1 appeals in New
York City are relatively rare because the system of caps, discussed in Part II.A.1, keeps
assessed values well below what they would be if based on market values. Appeals are
more common in other parts of the country. See Alina Tugend, Seeking Lower Property
Taxes on a House of Sinking Value, NY Times B5 (May 8, 2010) (noting that, in most
places, about 5 percent of homeowners go through the grievance process).
79 City of New York Tax Commission, 2013 Annual Report *13-14 (2013), online at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/taxcomm/downloads/pdf/annual-report.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014).
These tax reductions represent 3.1 percent of the city's property tax revenues in fiscal
year 2011. See Distribution of the Burden of New York City's Property Tax *20 (Furman
Center for Real Estate & Urban Policy 2011), online at http://furmancenter.org/files/sotc/
Distribution of the Burden of New York Citys PropertyTaxjll.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014).
80 City of New York Tax Commission, 2013 Annual Report at *6-7 (cited in note
79). Other persons "aggrieved" by the assessment, such as a lessee of the entire parcel
that is responsible for paying the taxes, also have legal standing to contest the assess-
ment. Tax Commission of the City of New York, How to Appeal a Tentative Assessment at
*2 (cited in note 51). The deadline to appeal is March 1 for all other properties. City of
New York Tax Commission, 2013 Annual Report at *7 (cited in note 79).
81 City of New York Tax Commission, 2013 Annual Report at *3 (cited in note 79).
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of the assessment, including the property's classification and
whether it should have received an exemption that it did not re-
ceive.82 The Commission cannot increase a property's assessed
value, but its policy is to advise the DOF "of clear instances of
apparent underassessment for appropriate consideration in the
next year."8 Applicants must support their request for review
with facts and arguments, and the burden of proof is on the tax-
payer, who must show by a preponderance of the evidence that
an adjustment is appropriate. 84 The Commission may review as-
sessments for both the current and immediately prior fiscal
years. Property owners may request that the DOF itself review
the property's estimated fair market value,85 but the DOF's web-
site states that "[i]t is important to remember that asking for a
Finance Review is not a substitute for appealing your Assessed
Value with the Tax Commission."86
There are four grounds on which a taxpayer may appeal her
assessment: (1) misclassification (the property has been as-
sessed in the wrong tax class); (2) excessiveness (the assessment
does not reflect all of the exemptions to which the property is en-
titled, or a cap has been exceeded); (3) inequality (for instance, if
a Class 1 property has been assessed at more than 6 percent of
its market value); and (4) unlawfulness (the property is fully ex-
empt).87 The typical application seeks a reduction in the proper-
ty's assessed value based on a claim of inequality, which is es-
sentially a dispute about the property's market value. 88 A
taxpayer in Class 1 will succeed on appeal if she can prove that
her property's assessed value is more than 6 percent of its actual
market value.
82 See Tax Commission of the City of New York, How to Appeal a Tentative Assess-
ment at *2 (cited in note 51). Taxpayers may also request an in-person hearing. Id at *3.
83 Id at *1.
84 Id at *2.
85 19 Rules of the City of New York § 37.06 (1992). These rules stipulate the proce-
dures that property owners must follow when requesting DOF review of tentative property-
value assessments.
s6 City of New York, Department of Finance, What to Do If You Believe Your Notice
of Property Value (NOPV) Has the Wrong Information, online at
http://www.nyc.govlhtmlldof/html/property/property-val-appeals.shtml (visited Nov 3,
2014).
87 City of New York Tax Commission, 2013 Annual Report at *2 (cited in note 79).
8 Id at *2-3 ("[Cihallenges to the assessed value for properties not subject to limi-
tations on assessment increases (Tax Class 1 and Tax Classes 2A, 2B and 2C) are, for
almost all properties, a dispute over the value as determined by the Department of Finance.").
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The Commission may offer an assessment reduction, a
change of tax class, or an exemption. Although more than 98
percent of all applicants are represented by a lawyer or other
professional, about half of Class 1 applicants represent them-
selves.89 Rather than provide affirmative arguments for its prop-
erty assessments during Commission proceedings, the DOF typ-
ically relies on the presumption that its assessment was correct
and leaves it to the property owners to overcome their burden of
proof.90 After the Commission makes an offer to adjust a tax-
payer's assessment, the adjustment is made only if it is accepted
by the taxpayer. Such acceptance must be accompanied by a
signed copy of the Commission's standard written agreement,
which requires withdrawing other judicial and administrative
proceedings related to assessments for prior years in which the
taxpayer has an interest.91 If the Commission's offer has been
accepted by approximately May 21, the adjustment will appear
on the final assessment roll published by the DOF around May
25. In this case, property tax bills for the following fiscal year
will reflect the adjusted assessed value.92
If the Commission's offer has not been accepted before the
roll has been finalized, or if the offer relates to a prior year, the
adjustment is implemented by remission; the DOF will recalcu-
late the property tax liability for the property and issue a refund
or credit to the taxpayer.93 Taxpayers who do not accept an offer
made by the Commission may seek judicial review of their as-
sessment by filing a petition in New York Supreme Court by Oc-
tober 24 and serving the petition on the Commission. 94 Such cas-
es very rarely proceed to trial. 95
89 Id at *7.
90 See id ("[Tihe assessment set by the Department of Finance is presumed correct.
The burden is on the applicant to offer substantial evidence to overcome the presumption,
and then to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the assessment should be re-
duced or otherwise corrected.").
91 City of New York Tax Commission, 2013 Annual Report at *10 (cited in note 79).
92 Id at *10-11.
93 Id at *11.
94 Id.
95 See City of New York Tax Commission, 2013 Annual Report at *14 (cited in note
79) ("[Iun 2013, there were 54 Article 7 petitions taken to trial and decided by the
Courts."). This Section discusses only the present, and very recent, state of the tax-
appeals process in New York City. For a description of the roots and history of tax ap-
peals in New York City, see Mark A. Willis, Tax Certiorari Proceedings and the Present
Real Property Tax System in New York City, 9 Fordham Urban L J 591, 600-12 (1981).
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B. A Simple Model of Legal Salience
In the next Section, I report empirical evidence that the use
of mortgage escrow reduces the likelihood that a homeowner will
appeal her assessment. I also report that the expected savings
from a successful appeal and the probability of winning that ap-
peal increase the likelihood of appeal. These variables were not
chosen at random from among the many that are included in my
data; they emerge naturally from a very simple theoretical eco-
nomic framework that guides my analysis. In the Appendix, I
provide an outline of that framework, which aids interpretation
of the results and provides justification for the variables that I
use in my empirical analysis. Although the formalization of the
framework is important because it helps make the assumptions,
logic, and predictions of the model precise, the intuition about
what motivates property owners in this framework is straight-
forward: a taxpayer will appeal her assessment if the expected
perceived tax that would be saved in a given year from appealing
is greater than the costs of appealing.96
The expected benefit from appealing an assessment is equal
to the probability of winning the appeal (p) multiplied by the re-
duction in taxes that the taxpayer would obtain from winning.
This reduction in taxes is equal to the tax rate (r) multiplied by
the difference between her property's assessed value according
to the DOF (AV) and her property's assessed value according to
her own estimate (AV). In a traditional model, the costs of ap-
pealing are subtracted from this amount to provide the net ex-
pected benefit from appealing. If this amount is greater than ze-
ro then the taxpayer is predicted to appeal, and not otherwise.
The sole innovation that I make to the traditional framework is
to allow the expected perceived tax saved from appealing to dif-
fer from the actual tax saved by introducing the variable 0,
which captures the salience of the tax. If 0 is less than one, then
the tax is less than fully salient and the expected perceived tax
savings from appealing are less than the expected actual savings
from appealing. If 0 is greater than one, then the tax is more than
fully salient and the expected perceived tax savings are greater
than the expected actual savings. U(appeal) is the expected per-
ceived tax savings from appealing, net of the costs of appealing.
U(appeal) = Op(AV- AV') - c > 0 (1)
96 1 assume that the decision incorporates only current-period costs and benefits for
the sake of simplicity.
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Several predictions follow straightforwardly from the simple
model in equation (1): A taxpayer is more likely to appeal as the
probability of winning an appeal, the salience of the tax, and the
tax savings from winning the appeal increase. The likelihood of
an appeal decreases as the cost of appealing increases.
Although the model captures important features of the ap-
peals decision, there are some interesting dynamic elements to
the decision omitted from my framework. Because New York
City's property tax law limits the rate at which a property's as-
sessment can increase from one year to the next, a successful as-
sessment appeal can reduce future, as well as current-year, tax-
es. By lowering the assessed value in the current year, a
successful appeal also lowers the capped value in the next year,
potentially resulting in a lower tax bill in that year as well. This
effect will be especially pronounced during periods of rapid price
appreciation. When prices are more stable, winning an appeal
will tend to have an effect only on current-year taxes. Thus, the
expected benefits of filing an appeal depend on expectations
about future price appreciation. 97
The model that I use also assumes that prior appeals have
no effect on subsequent decisions, except through the effect that
a successful appeal would have on the assessed value in those
years. Several of the variables in equation (1) could be affected
in unmeasured ways by previous experience with the appeals
process. For example, a taxpayer may become more effective at
making her case before the Commission as she accumulates ex-
perience. Once familiar with the appeals process, a taxpayer
may find it easier to navigate that process in subsequent years,
lowering the cost of appealing. Appealing is also likely to make
the taxpayer more aware of her property tax liability in subse-
quent years, possibly increasing its salience. On the other hand,
97 This effect appears to be well known, at least among some tax-appeals practitioners.
See Toluse Olorunnipa, Fewer South Floridians Appeal Property Tax Bills, Miami Herald
(Sept 19, 2010), online at http://www.ptagflorida.com/articles/2010/Fewer-South-Floridians
-appeal-property-tax-bills-09-19-2010.htm (visited Nov 3, 2014) (brackets in original):
[M]any tax appeal firms say now is an opportune time for homesteaded owners
to challenge their county-assessed values, because locking in a low assessment
this year will pay dividends in the future, when housing values eventually go
up. Florida's Save Our Homes law limits the increase in assessed values to 3
percent annually for homesteaded owners. Sharpe, who is filing appeals for all
of his personal properties, encourages his clients to challenge their assess-
ments this year to take advantage of the Save Our Homes law. 'Think about
the additional advantage of the cap of 3 percent [moving forward]," he said.
"It's like resetting the base."
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experience with the appeals process could reveal it to be more
costly than anticipated, making the taxpayer less likely to ap-
peal the following year. An additional factor is the use of tax-
appeals professionals, who could influence the intertemporal
dynamics of the appeals decision by targeting homeowners who
either have or have not recently appealed. Incorporating these
factors would complicate the model considerably and I omit
them to focus the salience issue, but these effects are worthy of
future research.
C. Empirical Approach and Dataset Construction
1. Empirical approach.
The ideal way to identify the causal effect of mortgage es-
crow (and tax salience) on appeals would be to randomly assign
mortgage escrow to half of the properties in the city and observe
the difference in the frequency of appeals between properties
with escrow and properties without escrow. This would ensure
that escrow use was independent both of observable and unob-
servable characteristics of the property and of the property own-
er that could influence whether the owner is likely to appeal her
assessment. Without randomization, such characteristics could
easily confound attempts to identify the effect of escrow on ap-
peals. To point out the obvious, escrow is generally used only if
the property owner has a mortgage. As noted above, escrow
tends to be required for government-insured mortgages and
mortgages originated with a loan-to-value ratio of at least 80
percent.
The owners taking out these mortgages and the properties
subject to these mortgages likely differ in relevant ways from
the rest of the population. Properties purchased with a small
down payment or a government-insured mortgage may be locat-
ed in specific areas, and if homes in these areas are more likely
to be overassessed because it is harder to find comparable sales
on which to base the assessment, this can give rise to a spurious
relationship between escrow and appeals. The difficulty of find-
ing comparable sales can arise because the properties them-
selves have unusual characteristics, or because there is less
turnover in the housing market and therefore less information
on which the DOF can base its estimate of a property's value.
Moreover, home purchasers who receive these sorts of mortgages
are not a random sample of the population and may be more or
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less likely to appeal their assessments because of differences in
education, familiarity with the appeals process, or access to pro-
fessional counsel on such matters. Individuals who opt out of es-
crow may also, on average, be more careful in attending to their
personal finances, which may also affect how closely they exam-
ine their property tax liability and the likelihood that they will
appeal.
Because of the unavailability of random assignment or some
quasi-experimental method, I attempt to identify the effect of
mortgage escrow on property tax appeals using a unique,
property-level panel dataset that allows me to control for all
time-invariant characteristics of the property and the property
owner that could influence whether the owner uses mortgage es-
crow as well as whether she is more likely to appeal her assess-
ment. For each individual property, I examine the relationship
between changes in escrow use and changes in appeals. This
"fixed-effects" approach constrains my analysis to those proper-
ties that both had escrow in at least one year and did not have
escrow in at least one year and estimates the effect of salience
by looking at the pattern of appeals decisions within individual
properties rather than by comparing across different properties.
The properties that I focus on are those for which the homeown-
er either paid off a mortgage or took out a new mortgage during
the sample period. The key assumption that I make in this ap-
proach to conclude that escrow use causes a change in the prob-
ability of appeal is that there is no unobservable time-varying
variable that affects both the decision to use escrow and the de-
cision to appeal.
2. Data collection.
I compiled the dataset that I use to analyze property tax ap-
peals from five sources. First, data on individual property char-
acteristics and appeals were taken from New York City's Real
Property Assessment Database (RPAD). I extracted records for
all one- to three-unit residences and residentially zoned vacant
lots for fiscal years 2010-12.98 1 then merged the properties in the
RPAD data with various geographic units to which they belong,
such as census tracts and subborough areas, which are units de-
fined by the US Census Bureau and that correspond roughly to
98 As noted in Part II.A.1, New York City's fiscal year runs from July 1 to June 30.
The fiscal year is named by the calendar year in which it ends.
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neighborhoods such as the Upper West Side of Manhattan or
Bedford-Stuyvesant in Brooklyn. Second, data from the Com-
mission were obtained for all appeals filed during the sample
period. These data include any reduction in assessed value of-
fered by the Commission and accepted by the property owner. If
an offered assessment reduction was accepted, I coded the ap-
peal as a "win" for the property owner, and if the Commission
did not make a reduction offer or that offer was not accepted
then it is coded as a "loss." Third, each property/year record was
matched to Zillow's housing-price index for the zip code in which
the property is located. Fourth, I used New York City's Auto-
mated City Registration System, which tracks property record
filings, to identify properties that transferred ownership during
the sample period. I excluded these properties from the sample. 99
Finally, I obtained information on escrow use for fiscal years
2010-12 from individual SOAs. The DOF makes SOAs for every
tax lot in the city available on its website. Among other things,
these bills indicate whether the property owner pays her proper-
ty taxes directly or whether they are paid out of mortgage es-
crow. I downloaded the final bill for each calendar year for each
property in my sample-approximately two million individual
property tax bills-and parsed these bills to extract information
on escrow use.
Because I am interested in understanding the decisionmak-
ing process of individual property owners, I restrict the sample
to only those properties (1) that appear in the RPAD sample for
all three years of the sample period, and (2) for which no trans-
fer was recorded in the city's registration system between Janu-
ary 2008 and March 2011. This helps to ensure that all appeals
decisions made with respect to an individual property were
made by the same property owner. The resulting dataset is a
balanced panel following 609,088 properties over three years,
resulting in 1,827,264 lots-per-year observations. The dataset
provides a rich picture of the properties for which appeals were
filed, the potential benefits of appealing, and the information
necessary to estimate the model in equation (1). I describe below
how I constructed variables in that equation from my data.
99 The sale of a property could be correlated with both changes in escrow use and
the probability of appealing, which would cause my estimate of the effect of mortgage
escrow on appeals to be biased. I dropped 51,560 properties from the sample because of
this restriction.
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a) Probability of winning on appeal. I use two proxy
measures of a taxpayer's subjective assessment of the probabil-
ity that she will win on appeal: (1) the appeal win rate in the
property's subborough area for the prior year, and (2) the appeal
win rate in the property's zip code for the prior year. Although
there is no way for a taxpayer to identify the win rate in her
neighborhood with precision, this variable may be a good meas-
ure of the estimate that a taxpayer generates through casual in-
formation collection (for example, conversing with her neighbors
or reading news articles). The win rate at a particular level of
geography is equal to the number of properties for which an ap-
peal was filed and an assessment reduction offer was accepted,
divided by the number of properties for which an appeal was
filed.100
b) Property tax salience. I use tax escrow as a proxy for
property tax salience. The tax-escrow variable is a dummy vari-
able that takes on a value of 1 if the property owner pays her
taxes out of escrow and 0 if not.
c) Nominal tax rate. Property owners do not know what
the nominal rate for the upcoming fiscal year will be at the time
that they decide to file an appeal. I use the nominal rate that is
actually chosen by the city council for that year.
d) Property owner's own determination of market value. I
cannot directly observe a property owner's belief about the mar-
ket value of her property, so I use two alternative proxy measures
of what that property owner thinks her property is worth. The
first measure assumes that people estimate the current-year
market value by using the DOF's determination of the property's
value in the prior year and then adjusting it for subsequent
changes in the overall level of housing prices in their zip code. I
use Zillow's housing-price indices to measure changes in the lev-
el of housing prices. The second measure assumes that people
estimate the value of their home by comparing it with the values
of homes in their immediate vicinity. Specifically, I use the av-
erage DOF estimate of the value of a square foot of Class 1 prop-
erty on the block on which a property is located, multiplied by
the size of that property, as the property owner's estimate of her
own property's market value.
e) Other variables. The DOF's determination of the prop-
erty's current-year market value and the assessed value from
100 Both the numerator and denominator include only properties that are in my dataset.
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the prior year are both observable in RPAD. The property own-
er's cost of appealing is unobserved, and I assume that it in-
cludes a component that is constant over time and a random
(unobserved) component that is uncorrelated with the observa-
ble determinants of appeals.
D. Results: Salience and Other Causes of Property Tax Appeals
1. Descriptive statistics: properties and property owners.
Table 2 reports summary statistics for various property-
valuation variables for the properties in my dataset, as well as
the probabilities of filing an appeal and winning an appeal that
has been filed, by escrow status and year. In each year, proper-
ties that use escrow are less than half as likely to appeal as
properties that do not use escrow. In 2010, for example, 0.37
percent of the owners of properties without escrow appealed
their assessments, while 0.16 percent of the owners of properties
with escrow appealed.1o1 Interestingly, the appeals win rate for
properties that use escrow is higher than the win rate for prop-
erties without escrow, suggesting that the appeals from escrow
properties are more meritorious on average than appeals from
non-escrow properties.102 Rows 3-5 show that escrow properties
have lower DOF-estimated market values, assessed values, and
annual tax liabilities, on average, than non-escrow properties.
Rows 6-8 show the average change in the DOF's determina-
tion of market value, assessed value, and property tax liability,
from year to year. For example, the average market value for
non-escrow properties in 2008 was $649,210. When the tentative
assessments for those properties were released in January 2009,
the average market value had fallen by $27,656. From 2008 to
2010, properties with escrow experienced a steeper decline in mar-
ket value and a smaller rebound than properties without escrow. A
comparison across rows of changes in market values, assessments,
101 Rather than adopt New York City's fiscal year for purposes of reporting my re-
sults, I use the following conventions: References to 2010 refer to the fiscal year from Ju-
ly 2010 to June 2011. "Current" values refer to the values for that fiscal year. "Tentative"
values refer to the values posted on the DOF's website in January 2011, applicable to the
fiscal year from July 2011 to June 2012. Properties identified as having escrow in 2010
are those for which taxes were paid out of escrow as of the last bill in calendar year 2010.
Properties with an appeal in 2010 are those that filed an appeal after receiving their ten-
tative assessment in January 2011. Years 2008 and 2009 follow the same conventions.
102 Using simple equality-of-proportions tests, the difference is statistically signifi-
cant at the 5 percent level for 2010, but not for 2008 or 2009.
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and tax liabilities also reveals one of the peculiarities of New
York City's tax system arising from the annual assessment caps:
assessed values (and tax liabilities) can increase at the same
time that market values fall.1o3 From 2009 to 2010, for example,
average market values for non-escrow and escrow properties fell
by approximately $18,500 while average tax liabilities for these
two kinds of properties increased by $156 and $184, respectively.
Rows 9-12 contain estimates of the overvaluation of proper-
ties in my sample, using both measures of the owner's estimate
of her property's market value. Using the Zillow-based measure
of market value, escrow properties were more overvalued in
2008 than non-escrow properties, but less overvalued or more
undervalued than escrow properties in 2009 and 2010. Com-
pared with other properties on their blocks, escrow properties
were overvalued and non-escrow properties were undervalued
across all years. The final two rows show the mean tax savings
that property owners in each column would have obtained from
successfully persuading the Commission that their assessed val-
ues should be based on their estimates of their properties' mar-
ket values. This is a counterfactual exercise for any property for
which the assessment would be increased by adopting the prop-
erty owner's estimate of market value, because the Commission
cannot increase assessments. The negative numbers in these
rows indicate that the average assessment would have increased
if it had been based on the property owner's estimate of market
value (and the Commission was not otherwise barred from in-
creasing assessments). Using either measure of home values,
the average tax savings from appealing is greater for the escrow
than the non-escrow properties.
Table 2 illustrates that that there are differences between
properties that have escrow and those that do not. Compared
with non-escrow properties, properties that use escrow tend to
(1) be worth less, (2) be overvalued relative to other properties
on their blocks, (3) have a higher probability of winning on ap-
peal, (4) have greater potential benefits from appealing, and (5)
have had bigger decreases in market value accompanied by bigger
103 This can occur when the capped value is far below 6 percent of the market value.
Consider an example: In 2010, Property A has a market value of $500,000 and an as-
sessed value of $15,000 (because it is a capped value). Suppose that in 2011 the property's
market value falls to $350,000. The property's assessed value in 2011 will be the lesser of
1.06 x $15,000 and 0.06 x $350,000. The first term, $15,900, is smaller, so the assessed
value in 2011 is $15,900. The assessed value (and tax liability) of the property has in-
creased as the market value has fallen.
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increases in tax liabilities during the sample period. These facts
highlight the importance of controlling for property-specific
characteristics in an analysis of the effect of escrow on appeals,
but they also make the higher appeals rate for non-escrow prop-
erties even more puzzling (if one ignores salience): facts (2)-(5)
all would be expected to make owners of escrow properties more
likely to appeal.104
Tables 3 and 4 report summary statistics on property own-
ers from New York City's 2008 and 2011 Housing and Vacancy
Surveys. The surveys report various housing-unit and household
characteristics and are conducted every three years to comply
with New York State and New York City rent-regulation laws.105
In Table 3 I report summary statistics for owner-occupied units
in one- to three-unit buildings, excluding condos and co-ops. 0 6
Table 4 further restricts this sample to households with mortgages.
Table 3 shows that, relative to properties without escrow,
households that pay their property taxes out of escrow are more
likely to have a male head of household, residents who are
Black, Hispanic, or Asian, and residents who are less likely to
have been born in the United States. They are larger than
households without escrow and more than twice as likely to
have children under the age of eighteen living in the home.
Households with escrow have slightly higher annual incomes, on
a per capita basis, than those without escrow, a difference that
is attributable to differences in wage income. Households with-
out escrow derive more of their income from social security, re-
tirement, and disability, while households with escrow have
much higher wage incomes. There is also a striking difference in
how long the two categories of homeowners have lived in their
homes; the average year in which households using escrow
moved into their homes is 1995, while households that do not use
escrow moved into their homes more than fifteen years earlier, on
average. This difference suggests the most important, obvious
difference between households with escrow and those without
104 The correlation between certain property characteristics and the use of escrow
illustrates the fact that escrow use is not randomly distributed across properties as it
would be in the sort of randomized, controlled experiment described in Part II.C.1. That
correlation motivates the fixed-effects approach that I use here.
105 See US Census Bureau, New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (Sept 5,
2013), online at http://www.census.gov/housing/nychvs (visited Nov 3, 2014).
106 I also restrict the sample to units in which the householder reports paying her
property taxes directly or out of mortgage escrow.
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escrow: 99 percent of homeowners with escrow have a mortgage,
while only 32 percent of those without escrow have a mortgage.
Table 4 reports the same summary statistics for homeown-
ers with mortgages. A comparison with Table 3 suggests that
much of the difference between homeowners with escrow and
homeowners without escrow is attributable to the differences be-
tween households with and without mortgages. However, even
restricted to mortgagors, members of households with escrow
are still more likely to be racial minorities, less likely to have
been born in the United States, likely to have lived in their
home for less time, and likely to have less valuable homes than
non-escrow homeowners. Escrow and non-escrow homeowners
also look much more similar in terms of their income, although
non-escrow homeowners still earn a greater share of their in-
come from passive sources.
Tables 3 and 4 illustrate that, in addition to differences in
property characteristics between properties that do and do not
use escrow, there are also differences in the owners of those
properties, the most important being the difference between
households that have a mortgage and those that do not. Some of
these differences might well be expected to affect whether a
property owner appeals her assessment. For example, home-
owners who have lived in their homes longer may be more likely
to be aware of the appeals process. Homeowners born in the
United States may be more likely to be fluent in English and
more likely to be confident about using an appeals process that
is difficult to navigate. 107 Homeowners with escrow, on average,
also have larger households, are more likely to have children,
and are more likely to be in the workforce, possibly leaving them
with less time to appeal their assessments. These descriptive
statistics highlight the importance of property and household
characteristics that could bias estimates of the effect of escrow
on tax appeals if proper controls are omitted from the empirical
model. As discussed in Part II.C.1, my approach permits me to
control for all characteristics of the property and property owner
that are fixed over the sample period and could affect the proba-
bility of appeal.
107 All of the forms on the Tax Commission's website appear only in English. See
New York City Tax Commission, Forms and Instructions (2013), online at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/taxcomm/html/forms/forms.shtml (visited Nov 3, 2014).
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2. Regression estimates.
I model the taxpayer's utility of appealing her assessment
as follows. The decision to appeal depends on the probability of
winning the appeal, the salience of the property tax, the value of
a successful appeal, and the cost of appealing. I estimate the fol-
lowing econometric model:
yist = /Jpst-i + 9Eit + yrt(AVit - AV'i) + pYt + ai + &t (2)
where yist takes a value of 1 if property owner i in neighborhood
s appealed in year t, but otherwise is equal to 0. In my study, t
could be the year 2008, 2009, or 2010. The tax-appeals win rate
in the property owner's neighborhood (s) in the prior year is psi-i,
which I assume the property owner uses as her best estimate of
the win rate in the current year. The neighborhood s refers to ei-
ther the property's zip code or its subborough area, depending on
the regression specification. Eit is the tax-escrow dummy varia-
ble. It is equal to 1 if escrow is being used and 0 if it is not. rt is
the nominal tax rate in year t. AVit and AV'it are the assessed
values of the property based on the DOF's actual estimate of the
property's market value, and the determination that it would
have made had it used the taxpayer's estimate of the property's
value.108 Yt is a variable with a value of 1 if the observation is in
year t and a value of 0 otherwise. This variable captures the av-
erage effect of anything that affected appeals for all homeowners
in that year. The coefficients in the model (8, 0, y, p) are estimat-
ed in the regression procedure. I model the unobserved costs and
benefits of appealing as having both individual-specific (ai) and
idiosyncratic (eit) components and assume that the idiosyncratic
component has a logistic distribution. Because the individual-
specific effect is likely correlated with the use of escrow and the
other variables on the right-hand side of the regression equation,
I condition on that individual fixed effect rather than assuming
that it is random, estimating what is known as a conditional-
fixed-effects logit model.
Table 5 reports regression coefficient estimates for the mod-
el on the entire sample of properties. Specification (1) assumes
that property owners form their beliefs about the value of their
108 The model has the same general form as other econometric models of the effect of
"fiscal illusion." See, for example, Wallace E. Oates, On the Nature and Measurement of
Fiscal Illusion: A Survey, in Geoffrey Brennan, Bhajan S. Grewal, and Peter Groe-
newegen, eds, Taxation and Fiscal Federalism: Essays in Honour of Russell Mathews 65,
68 (Australian National 1988).
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property using the Zillow housing-price index, and specification
(2) assumes that they use the mean value of Class 1 properties
on their block (as determined by the DOF). Specifications (3)-(6)
differ from specifications (1) and (2) in that they use the win rate
in the property owner's zip code (rather than the win rate in the
property owner's subborough area) from the prior year to meas-
ure the property owner's expectations about the probability of
winning an appeal. Specifications (5) and (6) differ from the first
four specifications by replacing the tax-savings variables with
separate variables for the amount of overassessment, 0 9 and the
current-year tax liability.11o
The effect of mortgage escrow on the probability of appeal is
negative and statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level in
all specifications. This statistical result means that it is ex-
tremely unlikely that the negative relationship between escrow
and tax appeals is observed by sheer chance, and that one can
have a great deal of confidence that there is a negative relation-
ship between escrow use and the likelihood of appeal. I also find
that the probability of appeal increases with the tax savings
from a successful appeal using both measures of market value.
The effect of the win rate in the subborough area is positive but
not statistically significant at conventional levels, but when ex-
pectations about the probability of winning are measured using
win rates at the zip code level, the effects are positive and statis-
tically significant. In specifications (5) and (6), the probability of
appeal is increasing in the expected tax liability for the current
year, but there is no effect of overvaluation on the probability of
appeal, although the coefficient has a positive sign. It is not sur-
prising that overvaluation itself does not have a significant ef-
fect on the probability of appeal. As described in the Appendix,
unless 6 percent of the homeowner's estimate of her property's
value is less than the capped value from the prior year, it will
not be rational to appeal no matter how much the DOF overes-
timates the property's true market value.
Table 6 reports coefficient estimates from the same regres-
sions but excludes all properties in Manhattan. Class 1 proper-
ties are comparatively rare in Manhattan (making up less than
I percent of the entire sample), and because of their sparseness
the Zillow housing-price index and the block-mean variables
109 This variable is defined as MV'it - Wit.
110 This variable is defined as rAVi.
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may not be good estimates of property owners' valuations of
their homes. The effect of escrow on appeals remains statistical-
ly significant in all specifications, as does the effect of tax sav-
ings, using both measures of market value. The effect of the
probability of winning, measured at the zip code level, is statis-
tically significant in three out of four specifications. As with the
whole sample, overvaluation itself has no effect on appeals, but
expected tax liability has a positive and significant effect."'
The easiest way to understand the size of these effects is to
compare their relative magnitudes by taking the ratio of the co-
efficients for any two variables.112 For example, the specifications
in Tables 5 and 6 contain a range of estimates for the effect of
escrow. Dividing these coefficients by the coefficients for the ef-
fect of tax savings on appealing tells us how important escrow is
as compared with the actual tax savings from a successful ap-
peal in motivating the appeals decision. Specification (4) in Ta-
ble 6 reports the most conservative estimate of the effect of es-
crow: paying taxes directly, rather than out of escrow, increases
the probability of appeal as much as a $7,000 increase in the tax
savings from a successful appeal.
3. Summary of results.
The results of the regression analysis are consistent with
the predictions of the simple economic model outlined in Part
II.B. The probability that a property owner will appeal her as-
sessment increases with each of the factors affecting the ex-
pected perceived benefits of appealing: the tax savings from a
successful appeal, the probability of a successful appeal, and the
salience of the property tax. Put another way, the results show
that after controlling for all of the fixed characteristics of the
property and the property owner that could affect the decision to
appeal-the amount by which the property has been overas-
sessed and the owner's estimate of the likelihood of winning in a
111 As a robustness check, six linear probability models were estimated with the
same covariates as the logit specifications, with the addition of subborough area/year
fixed effects to capture any neighborhood-specific shocks that varied across years. Es-
crow has a negative and statistically significant effect in all six of these models.
112 The regression coefficient estimates can be interpreted as the effect of the varia-
bles in the regression on the utility from appealing. Because the effect of the utility from
appealing on the probability of appealing is nonlinear (as it must be if the model's pre-
dicted probabilities are to always be between zero and one), the effect of any one variable
on the probability of appeal depends on the values of the other variables, which can
make it difficult to interpret the size of the coefficients.
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given year-and any factor affecting the likelihood of appealing
in a given year that is common to all property owners, using
mortgage escrow has a large and statistically significant nega-
tive effect on the probability that a taxpayer will appeal her
property assessment. The descriptive statistics reported in Tables
3 and 4 provide evidence about the households that are most
likely to bear higher taxes as a result of the use of mortgage es-
crow: they are more likely to be working families with children
and to be comprised of racial minorities and immigrants.
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
To point out the obvious, using mortgage escrow is not sup-
posed to increase your taxes. But because escrow reduces the le-
gal salience of the property tax, which reduces the probability of
appeal, taxpayers using escrow are more likely to remain over-
assessed and bear a heavier share of the tax burden. These
property owners face an additional burden as the tax saved by
those who successfully appeal is effectively transferred through
increased property tax rates to those who do not. This dynamic
exists in other areas of tax law. The interaction of a taxpayer-
initiated-tax-adjustment process with the idiosyncrasies of tax-
payers' circumstances results in a redistribution of the tax bur-
den that has gone unnoticed by policymakers and is unmoored
from any normative criterion.
Whether any particular redistribution is desirable depends
on the characteristics of the taxpayers who benefit from the en-
forcement procedures and the characteristics of the taxpayers
who do not; the allocation of tax liability after such redistribu-
tion could be better or worse than a system in which errors go
uncorrected. Consequently, when possible, evidence about the
causes and effects of differential tax enforcement should be tak-
en into account when identifying the distribution of the tax bur-
den and the tools for altering it.113 In this Part, I use the case of
113 A related argument has been made by Professor Wojciech Kopczuk, who argues
that when certain forms of tax avoidance are more accessible to low-ability taxpayers,
lax enforcement against such tax avoidance can have desirable redistributive effects,
achieving redistribution without the adverse incentive effects that would be required by
changing the marginal tax rate structure. See Wojciech Kopczuk, Redistribution when
Avoidance Behavior Is Heterogeneous, 81 J Pub Econ 51, 63-66 (2001). In a similar spir-
it, Professors Leandra Lederman and Ted Sichelman have argued that probabilistic en-
forcement of tax laws can also have desirable effects. See Leandra Lederman and Ted
Sichelman, Enforcement as Substance in Tax Compliance, 70 Wash & Lee L Rev 1679,
1719-24 (2013).
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the property tax to illustrate the effects that a system of taxpayer-
initiated-tax-adjustment schemes can have on tax allocation.
A. Accounting for Tax Enforcement
A real property tax is designed to tax the value of real prop-
erty. Under an ideal property tax system, the assessor would ac-
curately determine the values of properties and then tax liabili-
ties would be assigned on the basis of those valuations.114 In
reality, assessors make errors, overvaluing some properties and
undervaluing others, and tax liabilities are thereby misallocat-
ed. One can imagine several ways of reducing these errors, such
as investing in more accurate property-valuation methods or in-
creased assessment audits. Many jurisdictions rely on taxpayer-
initiated appeals processes to correct those errors. One conse-
quence of relying on taxpayers in this way is that arbitrary factors
that affect the decision to seek administrative relief can alter the
distribution of the tax burden.
Of course, the fact that the appeals process introduces an
element of arbitrariness into the assignment of property tax lia-
bilities does not mean that jurisdictions ought to eliminate prop-
erty tax appeals. After all, successful appeals reduce the over-
taxation of those properties that were erroneously overassessed
to begin with, itself a source of arbitrary variation in tax liabili-
ties. Determining whether the tax allocation following the ap-
peals process is preferable to an allocation reflecting only assessor
error requires carefully examining the two outcomes and scruti-
nizing the underlying factors affecting appeals. A simple exam-
ple will help illustrate. Table 1 summarizes four different en-
forcement scenarios. In each scenario, there are four different
property owners: A, B, C, and D. Assume that in all four scenar-
ios the four property owners each own a property with a true
market value of $100, and suppose that the government must
raise a fixed sum of $40. Assume also that the property taxes
due for a particular property are equal to the tax rate set by the
government multiplied by the assessed value of the property,
and that the assessed value of a property is equal to 100 percent
114 1 use "ideal" here in the very limited sense that there are no random errors in the
assignment of tax liabilities to properties so that there is perfect enforcement of the sub-
stantive tax laws. An "ideal" tax system may not be optimal because, under certain cir-
cumstances, random taxes could be welfare improving. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Utilitari-
anism and Horizontal Equity: The Case for Random Taxation, 18 J Pub Econ 1, 4-19
(1982).
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of the property's market value. Because the amount of tax rev-
enue to be collected is fixed at $40, the tax rate set by the
government will vary inversely with the aggregate assessed
value of the four properties.
TABLE 1. PROPERTY OWNER
Tax
Scenario Value A B C D Rate
L Ideal Assessment $100 $100 $100 $100 10.00%
Tax $10 $10 $10 $10
II. Assessor Assessment $100 $50 $125 $125 10.00%
Error Tax $10 $5 $12.50 $12.50
III, Error Assessment $100 $50 $100 $100 11.43%
with Appeals Tax $11.43 $5.71 $11.43 $11.43
IV. Error Assessment $100 $50 $100 $125
with Select 10.67%
Appeals Tax $10.67 $5.33 $10.67 $13.33
In scenario I, the "ideal" scenario, the assessor accurately
assesses the properties at $100 each. Because the aggregate
property value is $400, the government will set a tax rate of 10
percent and each taxpayer will pay $10 in taxes.
Scenario II illustrates the case in which the assessor makes
some errors in her assessments, correctly estimating the value of
A's property but undervaluing the property of B and overvaluing
the properties of C and D. Because the assessor's errors balance
out so that the aggregate assessed value of the four properties is
identical to the aggregate value in scenario I ($400), the gov-
ernment will again set a tax rate of 10 percent to raise the nec-
essary $40 in revenue. Relative to the ideal, C and D will each
pay $2.50 too much in property taxes and B will pay $5 too little.
Scenario III illustrates what might be expected to happen to
the allocation of tax liabilities arising from assessor error in sce-
nario II if taxpayers are permitted to appeal their assessments
and it is assumed that the appeals system perfectly corrects
those errors brought to the attention of the appeals tribunal and
is used by everyone with an incentive to appeal. Because A is ac-
curately assessed, she has no incentive to appeal and her assess-
ment will remain $100. Similarly, because property owner B is un-
derassessed, she has no incentive to report the assessor's error and
will not appeal; her assessment will remain $50. Property owners
C and D, on the other hand, will appeal and their assessments will
The University of Chicago Law Review
be corrected to reflect their true values: $100 each. Because the
aggregate amount of taxable property value has fallen relative
to scenario II (from $400 to $350), the tax rate in scenario III
must be greater than the tax rate in scenario II to raise the
same amount of revenue. The changing tax rate serves as a
mechanism that effectively shifts property tax liability from C
and D to A and B, causing A to be overtaxed but bringing B's tax
liability more closely in line with her liability in the ideal sce-
nario. Even though they are accurately assessed after their ap-
peals, C and D remain overtaxed on account of the persistent
undervaluation of B's property, which causes the tax rate to be
higher than it would otherwise be.
Scenario IV illustrates the case of New York City's property
tax. Suppose that the appeals process is not used by everyone
with an incentive to do so. For example, suppose that C is a
longtime homeowner who pays her property taxes directly to the
government and is aware of her property tax liability, whereas
D has recently taken out a mortgage and pays her property tax-
es out of mortgage escrow. As a result, D's property taxes are
less salient to her and she does not appeal her assessment. In
this case, the reduction in C's taxes resulting from a successful
appeal is passed to A, B, and D through the increase in the
property tax rate, causing B's liability to become closer to her li-
ability under the ideal scenario but causing A to be overtaxed
and D to be still more overtaxed.
It is not immediately obvious how we might rank the out-
comes in scenarios II, III, and IV in order of preference. Adopt-
ing a system of unbiased appeals in the presence of assessor er-
ror makes the liabilities of B, C, and D closer to their ideal
liabilities but causes A to be overtaxed (scenario II versus sce-
nario III). Adopting a system of selective appeals improves the
accuracy of B's and C's taxes but causes A and D to be overtaxed
(scenario III versus scenario IV). Relative to a system of unbi-
ased appeals, a system of selective appeals brings the liabilities
of A and C closer to their ideals but does worse for B and D. I
consider two approaches for evaluating these four scenarios. The
first way to evaluate these outcomes is as departures from the
presumptively optimal ideal system and to view the enforcement
issue as fundamentally a problem of minimizing errors. The sec-
ond way to evaluate these outcomes is by explicit reference to an
underlying normative criterion, such as welfare maximization.
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1. Error reduction.
The first approach to ranking these outcomes views the en-
forcement problem as one of error reduction. To be concerned
with how well-enforced the property tax law is-that is, how
closely actual liabilities align with liabilities that would be as-
signed if the law were perfectly enforced-we require a measure
of closeness. There are a couple. of natural ways of measuring
the "loss" or "penalty" associated with each error of misallocated
taxes, both of which assign a positive penalty to an error, re-
gardless of whether that error is an over- or under-assessment.
One measure would be to simply sum across all four property
owners the absolute difference between their tax liability in that
scenario and what their liability would be under the ideal sce-
nario. A system of unbiased appeals fares best using this meas-
ure. Scenario III is worse than the ideal scenario by $8.58 in tax-
liability differences; scenario IV would be worse than scenario
III by a further $0.76; and scenario II would be the worst, differ-
ing from the ideal by $10 in tax-liability differences. An alterna-
tive measure is to sum all of the squared differences between ac-
tual and ideal tax liabilities across taxpayers. This measure
would lead to the same ranking of the four outcomes as the first
but differs in two important ways: it is affected by the distribu-
tion of enforcement errors across taxpayers and amplifies large
deviations in individual liabilities from the ideal.1,5
The central shortcoming of approaching the problem as one
of error reduction is that there is no natural normative frame-
work to guide the choice between these different measures. Yet,
the magnitude and distribution of assessment errors has mean-
ingful consequences for the distribution of income and welfare
under the property tax. For this reason alone, the error-
reduction approach seems inadequate. Moreover, the error-
reduction approach presupposes that the "ideal" outcome is also
the appropriate normative target against which the others
should be measured. This need not be the case. As I illustrate in
the following Section, a tax regime with enforcement errors that
115 For example, consider scenario II.A (not represented in Table 1) in which the tax
liabilities of A, B, C, and D are $10, $5, $10, and $15, respectively. Measured using the
sum of absolute differences, this scenario is as bad as scenario II; both scenarios are
worse than the ideal to the extent of $10 in tax-liability differences. Measured using the
sum of squared differences, however, scenario I.A is worse than the ideal by $50 in
squared tax-liability differences while scenario II is worse than the ideal by only $38 in
squared liability differences.
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are selectively corrected by taxpayers through the use of admin-
istrative procedures could be preferable to the "ideal," depending
on the characteristics of the taxpayers who use the procedures.116
2. Evaluating the tax law as it is enforced.
The second approach reframes the problem from one of error
reduction in enforcement to a more basic question of how to
choose the optimal system of taxation in light of the expected en-
forcement effects. 117 Factors that are not specified in the law can
drive a wedge between the allocation of liabilities as they are as-
signed by statute and the allocation that actually arises. De-
pending on what these factors are, the actual allocation could be
more or less desirable than the one that would arise in the case
of perfect enforcement. Thus, whereas conventional analysis of
the property tax would ask whether it is fair, efficient, or other-
wise desirable to assign property liabilities on the basis of prop-
erty values (and any other observable characteristics specified
under the law), this approach asks whether property tax liabili-
ties should be assigned on the basis of market values after tak-
ing into account the effects of the enforcement mechanisms. By
shifting focus to an evaluation of these four scenarios as instan-
tiations of property tax law under different enforcement re-
gimes, we can bring to bear the conceptual apparatus that is
typically used to evaluate the substantive tax law. For example,
we can evaluate the outcomes from within a welfarist tradition
that assigns rankings to the outcomes by reference to the
well-being of the taxpayers themselves.118 To illustrate how
116 These characteristics will generally be unobservable to the taxing authority,
meaning that they cannot simply be directly incorporated into tax law.
117 Recent research in economics has made a similar argument in the case of com-
plexity. See Henrik Jacobsen Kieven and Wojciech Kopczuk, Transfer Program Complex-
ity and the Take- Up of Social Benefits, 3 Am Econ J: Econ Pol 54, 55 (2011) (treating
complexity "as a policy instrument that is chosen alongside benefit levels and eligibility
rules in the design of a program").
118 An alternative approach would be to analyze the problem as one of horizontal
equity. In its most platitudinal form, the concept of horizontal equity has considerable
intuitive appeal: equals should be treated alike. Of course, abiding by this rule requires
specifying the dimensions along which individuals or corporate taxpayers are relevantly
"equal." There are important questions about the normative significance of horizontal
equity. See, for example, Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: New Measures, Unclear Prin-
ciples *1-3 (Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business
Discussion Paper No 279, Mar 2000), online at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/
olinscenter/papers/pdf/279.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014) (arguing that horizontal equity
stands in the way of the advancement of human welfare). But see Brian Galle, Tax Fair-
ness, 65 Wash & Lee L Rev 1323, 1328 (2008) (arguing that horizontal equity has value
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such an analysis might proceed, I begin by comparing scenarios
I and 11.119
Suppose that the assessor error in scenario II is entirely
random, so that it is uncorrelated with any characteristics of the
taxpayers. In fact, for simplicity, assume that the four taxpayers
are completely identical in all respects (including income). What
are the consequences for those taxpayers of the random varia-
tion in the property tax? First, the variation increases income
inequality among the four taxpayers; B will have a higher after-
tax income than A, who in turn will have a higher after-tax in-
come than C and D. Having assumed that the four taxpayers are
identical, and making the additional assumptions that there is
diminishing marginal utility of income to the individuals and
that the welfare of the four taxpayers is valued equally by socie-
ty, the effective transfer of after-tax income from C and D to B
will be welfare reducing in the aggregate; social welfare will be
higher under scenario I than under scenario II. Viewed ex ante,
the assessor error effectively imposes a random tax on the prop-
erty owners. In addition to the $10 tax imposed on the true val-
ues of their properties, they face a 50 percent probability of pay-
ing a $2.50 tax and a 25 percent probability of receiving a $5
rebate (and a 25 percent chance of paying no additional tax).
The imposition of risk on individuals through a random tax
tends to be welfare reducing for risk-averse taxpayers. 120 For
these reasons, scenario I will generally be preferable to scenario II.
Making the same assumptions as before, scenario III repre-
sents an improvement in social welfare from scenario II but is
worse than scenario I. To see this, note that in scenario II the
marginal utility of a dollar is greater for C and D than for A and
as an independent normative criterion because it shows respect for past policy decisions
and facilitates revenue raising); Musgrave, 43 Natl Tax J at 113-14 (cited in note 16)
(arguing that horizontal equity should be viewed as an independent norm, not just de-
rivative of vertical equity); David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory,
24 Yale L & Pol Rev 43, 46 (2006) (discussing several possible justifications for horizon-
tal equity and concluding that the principle is best justified under "a theory of social jus-
tice that accepts the morality of the market distribution").
119 1 ignore any spatial issues arising in the study of optimal taxation in urban envi-
ronments. For example, if the marginal utility of income is correlated with distance from
the city center, it may be optimal to redistribute income in a manner that does not equal-
ize utility, even among households with identical preferences. See David E. Wildasin,
Spatial Variation of the Marginal Utility of Income and Unequal Treatment of Equals, 19
J Urban Econ 125, 126 (1986); J.A. Mirrlees, The Optimum Town, 74 Swedish J Econ
114, 121-24 (1972).
120 See Kaplow, Horizontal Equity at *17 (cited in note 118).
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B because the four taxpayers are identical, they have diminish-
ing marginal utility of income, and C and D are taxed more
heavily. The outcome in scenario III can be obtained by transfer-
ring tax liability from C and D to A and B, implicitly transfer-
ring income in the opposite direction, from taxpayers with rela-
tively low marginal utility to taxpayers with higher marginal
utility for income. This is an improvement from a social welfare
perspective. The introduction of an unbiased appeals process
does not, however, eliminate the partially random nature of the
tax distribution. In scenario III, no taxpayers are overassessed,
but the (random) underassessment of taxpayer B causes the tax
rate to be higher than it would otherwise be. The result is as if
taxpayer B had been chosen at random and a portion of her
property tax liability was shifted to the other taxpayers. On an
ex ante basis this could be viewed as a random tax in which each
taxpayer faces a 75 percent chance of paying $1.43 in tax and a
25 percent chance of receiving a rebate of $4.29.121 The random
tax component of the tax distribution continues to impose unde-
sirable tax risk on the taxpayers but, under conventional as-
sumptions about the taxpayers' attitudes towards risk, the ran-
dom tax in scenario III is preferable to the random tax in
scenario 11.122 For these reasons, scenario III is generally prefer-
able to scenario II but less desirable than scenario I from both ex
ante and ex post perspectives.
Under the same assumptions, the outcome in scenario IV
appears to generate less social welfare than scenario III, so we
might think that we should prefer a system of unbiased appeals
to one of selective appeals.123 On an ex ante basis, the taxpayers
face a random tax for which they will pay $0.67 with a 50 per-
cent probability, pay $3.33 with a 25 percent probability, and re-
ceive a $4.67 rebate with a 25 percent probability. Under con-
ventional economic assumptions about risk preferences,
taxpayers will generally prefer the random tax that they face in
121 This discussion assumes that both C and D appeal and abstracts from the costs
associated with an appeal. More precisely, taxpayers would face (1) a 50 percent chance
of paying the lesser of $2.50 (if they choose not to appeal) and $1.43 plus the cost of the
appeal, (2) a 25 percent chance of paying $1.43, and (3) a 25 percent chance of receiving
the $4.29 rebate.
122 The random taxes in scenarios I and III have the same mean, but the tax in
scenario III has lower variance.
123 Without additional assumptions about individuals' utility from income, we can-
not say for certain whether the outcome with selective appeals generates greater social
welfare than the outcome in scenario II.
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scenario III to this random tax, so the system of unbiased ap-
peals is preferable when viewed from this perspective as well.
But this analysis ignores a crucially important characteristic of
the outcome in scenario IV: it was generated by a nonrandom
process that caused tax liabilities to be allocated on the basis of
individual characteristics that are not generally observable by
the tax authority-that is, the variables that affect the appeals
decision. These same factors may provide information that the
tax authority would like to use in determining the allocation of
the tax burden but cannot because that information is unob-
servable. Whereas tax liability in scenarios I, II, and III is allo-
cated in a way that is unrelated to the characteristics of the tax-
payers, the outcome in scenario IV reflects these differences.
Whether this improves or worsens the de facto assignment of tax
liability from a welfarist perspective depends on the characteris-
tics driving appeals.
Appeals are affected by the salience of the property tax and
the psychic and monetary benefits and costs of appealing.124 We
can infer that the perceived net benefits to D of appealing her
assessment are less than those for C, perhaps because the op-
portunity cost of D's time is greater, D is less familiar with the
appeals process or is unaware of it, or D's property taxes are less
salient to her. If the opportunity cost of D's time is greater than
C's because D is more highly compensated and the taxing au-
thority would like to tax those with greater ability to pay, or if D
is more likely to default on her property tax payments in the fu-
ture, then imposing a higher tax burden on D while she is cur-
rent on her taxes might be desirable. Alternatively, if access to
professional advice or expertise in navigating administrative
procedures are important determinants of the appeals decision,
and these characteristics tend to be possessed by households
that the government would like to tax more heavily, then the
outcome is perverse in assigning a higher liability to D. In any
particular context, identifying which variables drive the pattern
of enforcement is an empirical question that must be answered
on a case-by-case basis.
124 Although mortgage-escrow use may be observable to the tax authority in some
circumstances, other factors affecting salience and the perceived costs and benefits of
appealing generally will not.
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The example explored in this Section illustrates a few gen-
eral points. First, mechanisms of enforcement can affect the dis-
tribution of the tax burden. Second, it is possible for the tax
distribution arising from imperfect enforcement to be preferable
to one arising from perfect enforcement when the system of im-
perfect enforcement gives effect to unobserved taxpayer charac-
teristics through the use of taxpayer-initiated administrative
procedures. Third, determining whether a particular enforce-
ment regime is superior to one of perfect enforcement is difficult
and informationally demanding. In particular, it is necessary to
know how the variables that affect the decision to use proce-
dures are related to the taxpayer characteristics that society
would like to tax. However, this is not an insurmountable obsta-
cle, as demonstrated in Part II, in which I identified (1) legal sa-
lience as an important variable in the property tax-appeals con-
text and (2) some taxpayer characteristics associated with legal
salience.
B. Applications to Other Administrative Procedures
One way that legal salience may play an important role in
affecting tax liabilities is through influencing the take-up of tax
credits and other tax expenditures. To obtain these tax benefits,
households and businesses have to file tax returns and some-
times satisfy additional documentation and application re-
quirements. The legal salience of these tax benefits is the effect
of their visibility or prominence on the use of the procedures for
claiming them. It seems likely that tax benefits that are owed
from the government to the taxpayer are less salient than taxes
that are owed by the taxpayer to the government. In general,
opportunity costs (the cost of not claiming a tax benefit in this
case) are not regarded as equivalent to out-of-pocket costs, 125 and
there is some evidence that the mortgage-interest deduction and
charitable-contribution deduction, specifically, have low sali-
ence. 126 There is also evidence to suggest that the lack of visibil-
ity of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) explains, in part,
125 See Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J Econ Behav
& Org 39, 43-47 (1980).
126 See Goldin and Listokin, Tax Expenditure Salience at *10-11 (cited in note 10).
The authors have also noted that tax expenditures may have low market salience, which
implies that their desired effects on, for example, home ownership or charitable giving,
may be muted. Id at *11-12.
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the fact that many potential EITC recipients do not file a federal
income-tax return and claim the credit.127 Thus, the legal salience
of the EITC could be a target of policymakers desiring to in-
crease take-up of the EITC or other tax-expenditure programs,
in addition to the other factors that are known to affect EITC
take-up,128 such as the complexity of preparing a return and un-
derstanding the program, 129 and the stigma associated with re-
ceiving government benefits.
Similar issues arise in the corporate-tax context. For exam-
ple, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimates that
between 4 and 12 percent of eligible employers claimed the
Small Employer Health Tax Credit for 2010.130 Although some of
the explanation for the low take-up is that the credit was an in-
adequate incentive for many small employers to provide health
insurance, the GAO reported that the complexity of the credit,
arising from eligibility, data collection, and computational re-
quirements, deterred many small employers from claiming it.131
More than one year after Congress authorized the credit, ap-
proximately 50 percent of small businesses were unaware of it.132
127 See Saurabh Bhargava and Dayanand Manoli, Why Are Benefits Left on the Ta-
ble? Assessing the Role of Information, Complexity, and Stigma on Take-up with an IRS
Field Experiment *4 (unpublished manuscript, 2011), online at http://econweb.umd.edul
-davis/eventpapers/BhargavaBenefits.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014) (arguing that low EITC
take-up is primarily due to low awareness of the program, incomplete information about
benefits and eligibility, and informational complexity).
12s Take-up is an active area of research in economics. See generally, for example,
Janet Currie, The Take Up of Social Benefits (National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper No 10488, May 2004), online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10488 (vis-
ited Nov 3, 2014); Kory Kroft, Takeup, Social Multipliers and Optimal Social Insurance,
92 J Pub Econ 722 (2008); Dahlia K. Remler, Jason E. Rachlin, and Sherry A. Glied,
What Can the Take-up of Other Programs Teach Us about How to Improve Take-up of
Health Insurance Programs? (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No
8185, Mar 2001), online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8185 (visited Nov 3, 2014);
Richard K. Caputo, EITC & TANF Participation among Young Adult Low-Income Fami-
lies, 4 Nw J L & Soc Pol 136 (2009) (concluding that EITC and TANF are underutilized
and that take-up is correlated with age, parenthood, marital status, prior program par-
ticipation, race, and gender, and arguing that the poorest are not taking advantage of
EITC because of a lack of computers and access to outreach websites).
129 For more on the application burden of the EITC to low-income households, see
Jonathan P. Schneller, Adam S. Chilton, and Joshua L. Boehm, The Earned Income Tax
Credit, Low-Income Workers, and the Legal Aid Community, 3 Colum J Tax L 176, 186-
94 (2012).
130 See Government Accountability Office, Small Employer Health Tax Credit: Fac-
tors Contributing to Low Use and Complexity *9 (GAO-12-549, May 2012), online at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590832.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014).
131 See id at *12.
132 Id at *15.
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Exploring how the salience of deductions and credits affects the
take-up of those tax expenditures and what that might imply
about the optimal design of those expenditures is a promising
area of research. 133
Legal salience might also be a factor in deciding to use pro-
cedures to reduce or delay payment of federal income taxes. Pro-
fessor Shu-Yi Oei has discussed these procedures, and the fact
that they have distributional consequences, in two related arti-
cles.134 Oei argues that tax collection reallocates tax burdens as
the costs of noncollection are passed to other taxpayers (current
or future) through increased rates, reduced government expend-
itures, or greater borrowing.35 Once the reality of this necessary
fiscal adjustment is appreciated, the peculiar way that New
York City's property appeals process redistributes taxes does not
look so peculiar after all. The anticipatory increase in tax rates
that mitigates the effect of tax appeals on city revenues is simp-
ly a more direct and mechanical way of balancing the city's
budget than through an unpredictable hodgepodge of current
and future tax increases or spending cuts.
One such procedure is the "offer in compromise." The IRS is
authorized under § 7122 of the Internal Revenue Code to enter
into arrangements that forgive some of the taxpayer's tax debt
133 A related concern is the effect of the complexity of the Internal Revenue Code on
the cost of claiming tax benefits. This cost can often outweigh the benefits of the expendi-
ture itself, and the cost can vary across companies of different sizes. See John D. McKin-
non, Firms Pass Up Tax Breaks, Citing Hassles, Complexity, Wall St J Al (July 23, 2012)
(reporting that the cost of tax compliance per employee is approximately twice as high
for companies with fewer than twenty employees as for companies with 20-499 employ-
ees and that "executives, particularly at small and medium-size companies, complain
that many of the tax deductions are either too cumbersome or too confusing").
134 See generally Shu-Yi Oei, Getting More by Asking Less: Justifying and Reforming
Tax Law's Offer-in-Compromise Procedure, 160 U Pa L Rev 1071 (2012); Shu-Yi Oei, Who
Wins When Uncle Sam Loses? Social Insurance and the Forgiveness of Tax Debts, 46 UC
Davis L Rev 421 (2012). Neither article explores in any detail the decision to use these
procedures or heterogeneity.
135 See Oei, 46 UC Davis L Rev at 425 (cited in note 134) ("[T]he costs of non-
collection may be imposed upon compliant taxpayers and the public in the form of higher
taxes; decreased government provision of goods, services, and social assistance; or mac-
roeconomic impacts resulting from increased government borrowing."). See also James
Alm, What Is an "Optimal" Tax System?, 49 Natl Tax J 117, 122 (1996) (noting that tax
evasion influences tax rates and public expenditures that affect other taxpayers); Joel
Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion, 21 J Econ Persp 25, 41
(2007) (noting that "[t]ax evasion affects the distribution of the tax burden as well as the
resource cost of raising taxes" and that even given evasion, "government programs could
be financed in a number of other ways, such as raising tax rates or broadening the in-
come tax base, and a tax reduction could be financed by cuts in overall spending").
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to the government if certain criteria are met. 136 The opportunity
to seek a compromise with the IRS on the amount of outstanding
tax liability can be very valuable to a taxpayer. At the same
time, many taxpayers are unaware of the option.137 Oei notes
that:
In order for an offer to be processed and approved, it must
first be submitted by the taxpayer. Although certain IRS ini-
tiatives have explored how to proactively identify those tax-
payers most likely to benefit from the procedure, those initia-
tives have not changed the underlying structural reality-the
taxpayer initiates the filing.138
Although Oei discusses some of the considerations that may
be relevant to a taxpayer in deciding whether to make an offer
in compromise, little is known empirically about what drives
that decision. Other procedures that taxpayers can avail them-
selves of to reduce or delay payment of their tax liability include
the right to apply for an installment agreement to govern the
payment terms, 139 to seek an extension of the time to pay, and to
change a prior year's return to obtain a refund.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I introduced the term "legal salience" to de-
scribe the effect that the psychological prominence of a tax has
on whether a taxpayer will use legal means to reduce the burden
of that tax. For the many tax regimes that permit taxpayer-
initiated administrative procedures to reduce tax liabilities, we
should expect that the legal salience of the tax will affect the de
facto allocation of the tax burden. I report evidence of just such
an effect, showing that property owners for whom the property
136 See Oei, 160 U Pa L Rev at 1077 (cited in note 134).
137 See id at 1106 ("In the Act's legislative history, Congress expressed its desire
that the IRS do a better job of informing taxpayers that the OIC procedure is available to
resolve tax debts."); Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998: Con-
ference Report to Accompany HR 2676, HR Conf Rep No 105-599, 105th Cong, 2d Sess
289 (1998) ("[T]he IRS should make it easier for taxpayers to enter into offer-in-
compromise agreements, and should do more to educate the taxpaying public about the
availability of such agreements."); Government Accountability Office, Tax Administra-
tion: IRS Should Evaluate the Changes to its Offer in Compromise Program *13 (GAO-
02-311, Mar 2002), online at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02311.pdf (visited Nov 3,
2014) (describing IRS efforts to inform the public of offer-in-compromise options, includ-
ing "outreach and education efforts").
138 Oei, 160 U Pa L Rev at 1121 (cited in note 134) (citation omitted).
139 See 26 USC § 6159.
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tax has low salience are less likely to appeal their property as-
sessments, leaving them more likely to remain overassessed and
overtaxed. In New York City, these property owners tend to be
certain mortgagors, who are more likely to be racial minorities,
immigrants, and working families with children.
This study illustrates three points of general applicability:
(1) the use of taxpayer-initiated administrative procedures af-
fects the distributions of tax burdens; (2) the tax distributions
that result after these procedures have shifted the tax burden
can be much better than, or much worse than, the initial distri-
bution, depending on what motivates taxpayers to use those
administrative procedures; and (3) although rigorously evaluat-
ing the effects of administrative procedures on the tax distribu-
tion is informationally demanding, it can be done. Legal scholars
have an important role to play in understanding these patterns
and alerting lawmakers to the unexpected effects of processes
and procedures on the allocation of the tax burden.
These points open up new avenues of tax-policy considera-
tions. Perhaps the first question is what lawmakers ought to do
when taxpayer-initiated procedures result in an undesirable
shift in the tax burden. Is substantive tax law the right place to
address these effects, or are they less costly to address through a
reform of the procedures themselves? In addition to enriching
the tax-policy discussion, there are theoretical implications of a
more nuanced view of the role that taxpayers play in determin-
ing the allocation of the tax burden through self-help proce-
dures. It is typical in both political philosophy and public eco-
nomics to evaluate tax systems from an ideal perspective,
assessing the fairness or efficiency of a system of taxation under
the assumption that the substantive rules accurately and finally
determine the allocation of the tax burden. In this world, taxes
are collected from only those who owe them, and transfers are
made to only those who are entitled.140 Scrutinizing standard
140 See Kroft, 92 J Pub Econ at 722 (cited in note 128) ("One of the central assump-
tions in the theory of social insurance provision is that all agents who are eligible for
benefits claim them."). At the same time, the literature on tax law compliance and en-
forcement is voluminous. For a summary of theoretical and normative work on these top-
ics, see Joel Slemrod and Shlomo Yitzhaki, Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration,
3 Handbook of Pub Econ 1423, 1426-45 (2002). There has also been research exploring
the effects of self-reporting on law enforcement, particularly in the environmental-
regulation context. See, for example, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Optimal Law
Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior, 102 J Polit Econ 583, 587-90 (1994) (incor-
porating self-reporting into an economic model of law enforcement); Robert Innes, Self-
Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement When Violators Have Heterogeneous Probabilities
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conclusions after taking into account the sometimes surprising
ways that taxpayers themselves shift that burden may lead to a
reappraisal of the efficiency and equity of these systems.
of Apprehension, 29 J Legal Stud 287, 290-96 (2000) (introducing differences across in-
dividuals in the probability of apprehension to the model of self-reporting); Robert Innes,
Remediation and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement, 72 J Pub Econ 379, 383-88
(1999) (exploring the effects of adding remediation to a model of enforcement with self-
reporting); Robert Innes, Violator Avoidance Activities and Self-Reporting in Optimal
Law Enforcement, 17 J L, Econ & Org 239, 246-54 (2001) (studying self-reporting en-
forcement regimes when individuals take actions to avoid apprehension).
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APPENDIX: A SIMPLE FRAMEWORK FOR THE PROPERTY TAX-
APPEALS DECISION
In each year t, a property owner incurs a set of housing-
related costs, including property taxes, property insurance,
maintenance, and, in the case of a mortgage, mortgage insur-
ance and principal and interest payments. In any year, for any
of the individual housing-related costs, a taxpayer can take an
action (with its own cost) that reduces that housing cost with
some probability. For example, the property owner could take
the time to investigate refinancing options for her mortgage to
obtain a lower interest rate or shop for more inexpensive proper-
ty or mortgage insurance. I focus on the decision to appeal the
property's assessment. At the beginning of each year, a property
owner can appeal her assessment by taking the action at E {0,1}
(at = 1 if the property owner appeals) that, for cost ct > 0, chang-
es her property's market valuation from MVt to MVi, with prob-
ability pt. If the appeal is successful, her property tax liability
will change from Tt to Tt. The cost of appealing could include the
time spent learning about the appeals process, completing the
paperwork, conducting research, attending an in-person hear-
ing, and hiring a professional appraiser.14'
I incorporate salience by allowing that property owners may
not accurately perceive the amount of their property taxes. I as-
sume that perceived property taxes are equal to aTt, where the
parameter A _ 0 represents the salience in year t of tax Tin year
t. A higher value of 6t corresponds to a more salient tax. I as-
sume that the taxpayer's utility is linear in property taxes and
the costs of appealing, so that every year the taxpayer solves the
following problem (time subscripts are suppressed):142
fmin a[pO(T'- 7) + c] + OT
a
A taxpayer will appeal by choosing at = 1 in a given year if
and only if the expected perceived tax savings from appealing
exceed the cost of appealing. In New York City, the tax due on a
141 The Commission recently imposed a $175 fee on applications for which the as-
sessed value of the property is at least $2 million. This is relevant for only the smallest
handful of luxury homes in the city. Prior to this there had not been any other filing fee.
City of New York Tax Commission, 2013 Annual Report at *7 (cited in note 79). Most
property tax-appeals representatives work on a contingency basis so their fees are not a
cost of appealing, although those fees would reduce the expected return.
142 1 assume here that the minimization problem for property taxes is separable
from the other decisions that the property owner faces.
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property is equal to the nominal tax rate rt multiplied by the as-
sessed value of the property AV The assessed value of a proper-
ty is the lesser of 6 percent of its market value or 106 percent of
its assessed value in the previous year:
Tt = rtAVt = rt min{0.06 MV, 1.06 AVt-i}
Define T't and AVt analogously as the tax due and assessed
value of the property following a successful appeal:
Tt " = rAVt"= rt min{0.06 MV" 1.06 AV 1i}
Substituting these two definitions into the taxpayer's deci-
sion problem, the model predicts that the taxpayer will appeal in
year t if and only if the utility from appealing is greater than zero:
U(appeal) = pt rt(AVt - AVt) - ct > 0 (1)
or equivalently,
pt~rt[min{O.06 MVt, 1.06 AVt-i} -
min{0.06 MV: 1.06 AVti}] - ct > 0 (la)
A taxpayer is more likely to appeal as the probability of winning
an appeal, the salience of the tax, and the tax savings from win-
ning the appeal increase. The likelihood of an appeal decreases
as the cost of appealing increases. Formulation (la) reveals sev-
eral additional predictions, best understood by thinking about
three cases. First, when 106 percent of last year's assessed value
(the "capped value") is less than both 6 percent of the current-
year market value as determined by the assessor and 6 percent
of the lowest market value that the property owner could suc-
cessfully argue for on appeal, such as can frequently occur dur-
ing periods of rapid price appreciation, the taxpayer will not ap-
peal, regardless of whether the assessor has overvalued the
property. That is simply to say that if the taxpayer's tax liability
would not be reduced even if she convinced the Commission that
her property had been overvalued, there is no benefit to appeal-
ing. In fact, the annual Notice of Property Value counsels own-
ers in precisely this manner.143 Second, when the capped value is
143 Property owners are advised that their assessment will not be reduced unless
they can demonstrate that the value of their property is less than the "effective market
value" reported on the Notice. What to Do if You Believe Your Notice of Property Value
(NOPV) Has the Wrong Information (NYC Finance), online at http://www.nyc.gov/html/
dof/htmllproperty/property.val-appeals.shtml (visited June 5, 2014). The effective mar-
ket value of the property is the amount that, when multiplied by 6 percent, is equal to
the assessed value. Thus, for a property with an assessment that is subject to the cap,
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greater than 6 percent of the assessor's determination of market
value, the benefit of a successful appeal is equal to the full tax-
effected value of the reduction in market value, or rt x 0.06(MVt
- MVt). Finally, if the capped value is greater than 0.06MV 'but
less than 0.06Mt, then the potential benefit of a reduction in
market value is rt(1.06AVti - 0.06MV). Consequently, the
amount of home price appreciation from year to year can affect
the benefits and, hence, probability of appeal, with the probabil-
ity being greatest during periods of low appreciation and lowest
during periods of high appreciation.
the effective market value in year t is equal to (1.06/0.06)AVt.,. My description of the lan-
guage in the text is mathematically equivalent.
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TABLE 2. PROPERTY-VALUATION SUMMARY STATISTICS BY
ESCROW USE AND YEAR
2008 2009 2010
No No No
Variable Stat Escrow Escrow Escrow Escrow Escrow Escrow
Probability Mean 0.32% 0.15% 0.29% 0.12% 0.37% 0.16%
of Appeal SD 5.62% 3.87% 5.39% 3.46% 6.09% 3.95%
Probability Mean 10.42% 11.16% 13.40% 14.09% 10.75% 14.23%
of Appeal
Win SD 1.82% 1.29% 1.98% 1.30% 2.00% 1.49%
Current Mean 649,210 580,797 622,193 544,821 606,783 524,775
FMV SD 867,080 345,294 894,666 328,503 902,396 329,559
CurrentAssee Mean 20,255 20,032 20,771 20,615 21,424 21,265Assessed
Value SD 22,347 11,167 23,036 11,586 23,992 11,917
Current Mean 3,281 3,244 3,549 3,523 3,720 3,692
Tax
Liability SD 3,619 1,809 3,936 1,980 4,166 2,069
FMV Mean -27,656 -32,920 -18,519 -18,414 6,476 -36
Change SD 297,547 84,121 445,945 55,726 352,318 99,477
AV Mean 473 672 567 733 506 500
Change SD 3,245 2,314 3,094 1,825 3,266 2,129
TaxLab Mean 262 293 156 184 88 87Liability
Change SD 603 407 553 322 567 370
Over-vui Mean 18,597 20,094 
-1,068 
-5,200 17,882 17,609valuation
(Zillow) SD 157,077 93,697 195,447 64,671 173,596 96,131
Over-
vui Mean -3,577 5,049 
-6,388 5,475 
-7,439 6,215valuation
(Block) SD 455,387 143,155 442,036 147,920 406,179 157,907
TaxSavn Mean 
-2,347 
-1,754 -2,411 
-1,785 
-2,269 
-1,484Savings
(Zillow) SD 4,788 2,203 4,271 2,127 4,808 2,343
TaxSaxn Mean -2,718 
-1,922 
-2,609 -1,693 
-2,659 -1,623Savings
(Block) SD 5,919 2,290 6,740 2,409 6,536 2,572
N 290,753 310,779 294,345 314,507 289,502 319,350
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TABLE 3. NEW YORK CITY HVS HOUSEHOLD SUMMARY
STATISTICS BY ESCROW USE AND YEAR
Variable
Male HH
SE
Move-In Year
SE
US Born
SE
Unit Value
SE
Mortgage
SE
% White
St
% Black
SE
% Hispanic
SE
% Asian
SE
% Child M
under 18 SF
People in M
Household SF
Income M
per Person SE
All Wage M
Income SF
All Social M
Security SF
All Retirement/ M
Disability SF
N
2008
Stat No Escrow Escrow
ean 51.22% 53.63%
0.76% 0.74%
ean 1978 1994
0 0
ean 48.40% 33.60%
0.76% 0.70%
ean 474,157 456,407
4,718 4,340
ean 30.78% 98.55%
0.71% 0.18%
ean 60.59% 41.39%
0.75% 0.73%
ean 18.75% 29.84%
0.60% 0.68%
ean 9.09% 15.19%
0.44% 0.53%
ean 10.66% 12.93%
0.47% 0.49%
ean 23.05% 50.08%
0.64% 0.74%
ean 2.59 3.36
0.02 0.02
ean 28,582 31,292
496 578
ean 49,825 77,751
1,050 1,063
ean 6,890 2,097
136 87
ean 4,626 1,960
217 134
4.513 4.982
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2011
No Escrow
51.03%
0.66%
1979
0
49.20%
0.66%
501,541
4,662
31.67%
0.62%
60.25%
0.65%
18.28%
0.51%
9.15%
0.38%
11.47%
0.42%
22.58%
0.55%
2.61
0.02
30,531
558
51,590
957
7,333
127
4,964
192
5.947
Escrow
53.71%
0.65%
1995
0
33.61%
0.61%
477,934
4,254
98.88%
0.14%
40.71%
0.64%
29.52%
0.59%
15.25%
0.47%
13.72%
0.44%
49.33%
0.65%
3.40
0.02
32,055
514
80,387
1,010
2,234
80
2,005
118
6.375
513 4982 76375
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TABLE 4. NEW YORK CITY HVS HOUSEHOLD SUMMARY
STATISTICS BY ESCROW USE AND YEAR, HOUSEHOLDS WITH
MORTGAGES
Variable
2008
No
Stat Escrow Escrow
No
Escrow Escrow
Male HH
Move-In Year
US Born
Unit Value
Mortgage
% White
% Black
% Hispanic
% Asian
% Child
under 18
People in
Household
Income
per Person
All Wage
Income
All Social
Security
All Retirement/
Disability
Mean 54.71% 53.69%
SE 1.37% 0.74%
Mean 1990 1994
SE 0 0
Mean 41.97% 33.42%
SE 1.36% 0.70%
Mean 498,249 457,258
SE 9,264 4,388
Mean 1,507 1,334
SE 81 42
Mean 45.88% 41.16%
SE 1.37% 0.73%
Mean 22.51% 29.89%
SE 1.15% 0.68%
Mean 13.89% 15.28%
SE 0.95% 0.54%
Mean 16.26% 13.00%
SE 1.00% 0.50%
Mean 47.21% 50.35%
SE 1.37% 0.74%
Mean 3.38 3.37
SE 0.04 0.02
Mean 76,115 78,148
SE 2,164 1,071
Mean 76,115 78,148
SE 2,164 1,071
Mean 2,842 2,039
SE 182 87
Mean 2,503 1,929
SE 279 134
N 1,456 4,914
2014]
54.40%
1.17%
1991
0
44.17%
1.17%
517,628
8,610
1,680
64
46.55%
1.17%
22.26%
0.98%
13.44%
0.80%
16.50%
0.87%
45.24%
1.17%
3.36
0.04
78,162
1,924
78,162
1,924
3,233
173
2,828
254
1,949
53.75%
0.65%
1995
0
33.47%
0.62%
478,832
4,292
1,574
34
40.53%
0.64%
29.56%
0.60%
15.32%
0.47%
13.78%
0.45%
49.52%
0.65%
3.41
0.02
80,722
1,017
80,722
1,017
2,191
80
1,982
118
6,307
1506 The University of Chicago Law Review [81:1443
TABLE 5. CONDITIONAL-FIXED-EFFECT-LOGIT ESTIMATES OF THE
CAUSES OF APPEALS, WHOLE SAMPLE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Escrow -0.503*** -0.509*** -0.502*** -0.504*** .0.520*** .0.516***(0.147) (0.144) (0.147) (0.145) (0.146) (0.148)
Tax Savings 0.018* 0.018*
(Zillow) (0.008) (0.008)
Tax Savings 0.058*** 0.059***
(Block) (0.017) (0.016)
Overvaluation 2.63e-6
(Zillow) (7.89e-4)
Overvaluation 8.17e-04
(Block) (8.50e-4)
Tentative 0.176*** 0.182***
Tax Bill (0.027) (0.030)
SBA 0.414 0.251
Win Rate (0.414) (0.399)
Zip Code 0.507* 0.572* 0.683** 0.630*
Win Rate (0.250) (0.243) (0.245) (0.252)
-0.306*** -0.331*** -0.316*** -0.362*** -0.465*** -0.412***
(0.059) (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.059)
0.123 0.096 0.105 0.048 -0.083 -0.027
(0.064) (0.061) (0.058) (0.055) (0.058) (0.062)
Property
Fixed Effects
N 6771 7311 6697 7238 7253 6697
Pseudo R2 0.018 0.020 0.019 0.022 0.029 0.027
LogLikelihood 
-2432.3 
-2620.4 
-2403.8 
-2590.1 
-2575.8 
-2382.9
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses. Tax savings and liabilities are per
thousand dollars. Overvaluations are per ten-thousand-dollar increment.
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
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TABLE 6. CONDITIONAL-FIXED-EFFECT-LOGIT ESTIMATES OF THE
CAUSES OF APPEALS, MANHATTAN EXCLUDED
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-0.485** -0.518*** -0.484** -0.514*** -0.540*** .0.501***(0.148) (0.146) (0.148) (0.147) (0.149) (0.150)
Tax Savings 0.040** 0.039*
(Zillow) (0.015) (0.015)
Tax Savings 0.074*** 0.074***
(Block) (0.020) (0.020)
Overvaluation 0.001
(Zillow) (0.001)
Overvaluation 0.002
(Block) (0.002)
Tentative 0.300*** 0.293***
Tax Bill (0.041) (0.041)
SBA 0.340 0.270
Win Rate (0.419) (0.405)
Zip Code 0.441 0.588* 0.647** 0.563*
Win Rate (0.253) (0.247) (0.249) (0.256)
-0.294*** -0.347*** .0.305*** -0.381*** -0.508*** -0.439***
(0.060) (0.058) (0.059) (0.056) (0.058) (0.062)
0.143* 0.093 0.124" 0.043 -0.117 -0.044
(0.065) (0.063) (0.059) (0.057) (0.061) (0.065)
Property
Fixed Effects
N 6537 6996 6475 6935 6950 6475
Pseudo R2 0.019 0.022 0.020 0.023 0.036 0.033
Log 
-2345.0 
-2503.5 -2321.2 -2477.3 
-2449.8 -2289.3Likelihood
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses. Tax savings and liabilities are per
thousand dollars. Overvaluations are per ten-thousand-dollar increment.
*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001

